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High-frequency traders (HFTs) accounted for roughly forty percent of trading volume
on the NASDAQ Stock Market in 2009, but there is little evidence on the type of information
these investors trade on. This study tests the hypothesis that HFTs anticipate and trade
ahead of other investors’ order flow. I find that HFTs’ aggressive purchases predict future
aggressive buying by non-HFTs, and their aggressive sales predict future aggressive selling by
non-HFTs. The positive correlation between trading by HFTs and future trading by other
investors is robust to the exclusion of trading around news releases, indicating the effect is
not driven by HFTs reacting to news announcements faster than other investors. The effects
are stronger in the morning and on high volume days. There are also persistent differences
among HFTs in the tendency of their trades to predict future order flow. These findings have
implications for the speed at which prices adjust to new information, incentives to acquire




List of Tables vii
List of Figures viii
Chapter 1. Do High-frequency traders anticipate buying and selling pres-
sure? 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 Market Structure Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.3.1 Identification of high-frequency traders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.3.2 Sample stocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.3.3 Trade imbalances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.3.4 Intra-day returns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.4 Do trades from HFTs lead trades from non-HFTs? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.5 Alternative explanations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.5.1 Controlling for serial correlation and returns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.5.2 Excluding trading around news events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.5.3 Inventory management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1.6 Why is non-HFT order flow predictable? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.7 Conditioning on times when HFTs are likely to be impatient . . . . . . . . . 30
1.7.1 VAR estimates near the market open and close . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
1.7.2 VAR estimates on high volume and high imbalance days . . . . . . . . 33
1.7.3 VAR estimates in high versus low spread stocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1.8 Cross-sectional differences in prediction ability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
1.9 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Appendices 69
v
Appendix A. Supplementary Tables 70




1.1 Summary of Stock Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
1.2 Summary of Stock-Day Observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
1.3 Summary of News Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
1.4 Non-HFT Net Marketable Buying for Stocks Sorted by HFT Net Marketable
Buying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
1.5 Returns for Stocks Sorted by HFT Net Marketable Buying . . . . . . . . . . 52
1.6 Intra-day VAR Estimates for Individual Stock-day Observations . . . . . . . 54
1.7 VAR Estimates on Days with and without News . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
1.8 Predicting Order Flow with Returns and Quotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
1.9 VAR Estimates at Different Times of the Day . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
1.10 VAR Estimates on High Volume and High Imbalance Days . . . . . . . . . . 64
1.11 VAR Estimates for Stocks with High versus Low Spreads . . . . . . . . . . . 66
1.12 Examining Cross-sectional Differences in Prediction Ability . . . . . . . . . . 68
A.1 Summary of CRSP Universe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
A.2 Sample Universe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
A.3 Detailed Summary of Stock-Day Observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
A.4 Returns for Stocks Sorted by High-Frequency Trader Net Buying . . . . . . 74
A.5 Robustness of VAR to Price Feed Latency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
B.1 Different weighting schemes for VAR coefficients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
vii
List of Figures
1.1 Cumulative HFT vs. non-HFT Net Marketable Buying. . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
1.2 Returns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
1.3 Post-sort Returns By Size Portfolios. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
1.4 Response of non-HFT Net Marketable Buying to a One Standard Deviation
Shock to HFT Net Marketable Buying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
1.5 HFT Net Buying and Returns 60 minutes before and after intense HFT Net
Marketable Buying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
1.6 Transition Probabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
A.1 HFTs’ Share of NASDAQ Dollar Volume . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
A.2 Liquidity Removing Trades as a Percent of HFT Dollar Volume . . . . . . . 81
A.3 Market Share By Trading Venue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
A.4 Coefficients from VAR with 30 lags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
A.5 Cumulative HFT Net Buying vs. non-HFT Net Marketable Buying . . . . . 84
A.6 HFT Net Buying and Returns 60 minutes before and after intense HFT Net
Marketable Buying By Size Portfolio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
A.7 Response of non-HFT Net Marketable Buying to a One Standard Deviation
Shock to HFT Net Marketable Buying: Different Times of the Day . . . . . 88
B.1 Heteroskedasticity in stock-day VAR coefficients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
viii
Chapter 1




Most trading in equity markets today is automated, and a large portion of these auto-
mated trades originate from short-term investors known as high-frequency traders (HFTs).
These HFTs account for a substantial fraction of equity market trading volume, including
roughly 40% of NASDAQ dollar volume in 2009.1 Since HFTs are market makers on many
exchanges, one would expect market making to account for much of their trading activity.
A simple way to get a rough lower bound on the share of their trading that is not due to
market making is to split HFT volume into the fraction due to liquidity providing versus
liquidity removing trades. Doing so reveals that a little over half of HFTs’ dollar volume
is actually due to trades in which HFTs remove liquidity from the order book with a mar-
ketable order.2,3 While HFTs’ liquidity providing trades very likely benefit other investors,
the effect of their liquidity removing trades is unclear.
This paper examines whether HFTs’ liquidity removing trades arise from strategies
that anticipate and trade ahead of traditional asset manager order flow. Since HFTs’ exper-
tise lies in extracting information from price and order data feeds, they seem well suited to
the type of analysis that could reveal information about future order flow. If, indeed, an
HFT were able to forecast a traditional asset managers’ order flow, then the HFT may have
an incentive to trade ahead of the traditional asset manager in order to profit from their
1 Appendix Figure A.1 displays HFTs’ share of dollar volume for all stocks trading on the NASDAQ
Stock Market.
2All orders on the NASDAQ Stock Market are limit orders. A marketable buy order is a buy order with
a limit price at least as high as the best ask, and a marketable sell order is a sell order with a limit price at
least as low as the best bid. Thus, marketable orders are functionally equivalent to market orders.




Anticipatory trading of this form has the potential to affect both liquidity and price
efficiency. An HFT taking liquidity that non-HFTs intend to access could cause stock prices
to move against non-HFTs right before they trade, thereby increasing non-HFT trading costs.
Moreover, if HFTs anticipate informed non-HFT trades, then the result is equivalent to an
increase in the number of informed investors, which speeds the rate at which prices adjust to
the non-HFTs’ information. But since HFTs anticipating informed non-HFT trades capture
profits that would otherwise accrue to non-HFTs, the long-run effect could be a reduction in
information production by non-HFTs. For these reasons, it is important to understand the
extent to which HFTs anticipate and trade ahead of other investors’ order flow.
To examine these issues, I analyze return and trade patterns around periods of aggres-
sive buying and selling by HFTs using unique trade data from the NASDAQ Stock Market.
Specifically, I focus on HFTs’ aggressive trades, that is, trades where an HFT initiates the
transaction by submitting a marketable buy or sell order, because it is a simple way to screen
out liquidity providing trades. I test whether HFTs’ aggressive share purchases predict fu-
ture aggressive buying by non-HFTs, and whether HFTs’ aggressive sales predict future
aggressive selling by non-HFTs.
I find evidence consistent with HFTs being able to anticipate order flow from other
investors. In tests where stocks are sorted by HFT net marketable buying at the one second
horizon, the stocks bought most aggressively by HFTs have cumulative standardized non-
HFT net marketable buying of 0.66 over the following thirty seconds. For the median stock,
this equates to non-HFTs buying roughly 28 more shares with marketable orders than they
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sell with marketable orders over the next thirty seconds.4 The figures for stocks HFTs sell
most aggressively are similar, but in the opposite direction. Moreover, the stocks HFTs buy
aggressively have positive future returns, and the stocks they sell aggressively have negative
future returns.
I consider several explanations for these findings. One possibility is the results are
driven by HFTs responding to news faster than other investors. I test this hypothesis by ex-
amining the lead-lag relationship between HFT and non-HFT net marketable during periods
containing no stock-specific news. HFT net marketable buying continues to lead non-HFT
net marketable buying, even when there is no news about a stock. A second explanation is
that HFT and non-HFT trading are driven by the same underlying serially correlated process
(i.e., same trading signals), so HFT trading predicts non-HFT order flow only because it is a
proxy for lagged non-HFT trading. However, HFT net marketable buying remains positively
correlated with non-HFT net marketable buying after controlling for serial correlation in
non-HFT trading. A third explanation is that if non-HFTs chase price trends, HFTs might
actually cause future trading by non-HFTs through their effect on returns. But controls for
lagged returns do not drive the relationship between HFT and non-HFT trading to zero,
which is inconsistent with this third hypothesis.
I also examine whether there are cross-sectional differences in how well different HFTs’
trades forecast future order flow. Perhaps some HFTs are more skilled or focus more on
strategies that anticipate order flow, while others focus on market making or index arbitrage.
There are indeed persistent differences among HFTs. Trades from HFTs that were the most
4The median standard deviation of a stock’s non-HFT net marketable buying, available in Table 1.2, is
42. The 28 share figure comes from multiplying 0.66 by 42.
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highly correlated with future order flow in a given month have trades that also exhibit
stronger than average correlation with future non-HFT order flow in later months.
While other papers have examined HFTs, this is the first paper to find that 1) HFTs
anticipate buying and selling pressure from other investors, 2) some HFTs are better than
others at anticipating order flow, and 3) while HFTs are contrarian at longer horizons, their
aggressive trades chase returns over the prior three seconds. Brogaard (2011a) studies the
determinants and characteristics of HFT activity, including the relative probability an HFT
execution is immediately followed by a non-HFT execution in the same direction, but he
finds conflicting results for whether HFTs trade ahead of other investors. Hendershott and
Riordan (2011b) find that HFTs tend to buy prior to permanant price increases and sell prior
to permanent price declines. Kirilenko, Kyle, Samadi, and Tuzun (2011) study HFTs’ trades
in the E-mini futures contract during the May 6th, 2010, “Flash Crash” and find that HFTs
neither took large long nor large short positions as the market crashed. Brogaard (2011b)
studies how HFT activity is related to volatility. O’Hara, Yao, and Ye (2011) examine price
discovery through odd-lot trades, which they show are commonly used by HFTs. This paper
builds on this literature by exploring whether HFTs use information about future order flow
to predict price changes.
This study also contributes to a small but growing literature on how market partic-
ipants’ adoption of algorithmic trading strategies affects markets. Hendershott, Jones, and
Menkveld (2011) find that an increase in electronic message traffic on the NYSE is associated
with lower bid-ask spreads and less price discovery through trades. Hendershott and Riordan
(2011a) show that trades and quotes entered by algorithms on the Deutsche Boerse are more
informative about permanent price changes than those entered by humans, and algorithms
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supply relatively more liquidity when spreads are wide. Chaboud, Chiquoine, Hjalmarsson,
and Vega (2009) study liquidity provision and price discovery by algorithmic traders in for-
eign exchange markets. Hasbrouck and Saar (2011) find that trade and quote activity by
traders using low-latency strategies on NASDAQ decrease spreads, increase depth, and lower
volatility. In contrast to the present paper and the aforementioned HFT studies, since the
above studies do not have investor identifiers, they cannot distinguish algorithmic trading by
HFTs from that of other investors. This paper contributes to this literature by specifically
focusing on lead-lag relationships between trades of these two types of investors.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 1.2 provides an overview of NASDAQ
market structure and how it relates to other trading venues. Section 1.3 discusses the trade
and return data. Section 1.4 examines whether HFT net marketable buying leads non-HFT
net marketable buying. Section 1.5 examines alternative explanations for the results on the
relationship between HFT and non-HFT net marketable buying. Section 1.6 explores the
hypothesis that HFTs might use past returns and quotes to predict non-HFT order flow.
Section 1.7 examines lead-lag effects between HFT and non-HFT trading in scenarios when
non-HFTs are hypothesized to be impatient. Section 1.8 examines cross-sectional differences
in the correlation between HFT firms’ trades and non-HFT net marketable buying. Finally,
section 1.9 concludes.
1.2 Market Structure Overview
There have been a number of changes to equity market structure since the mid-1990s.
In light of these changes, it is helpful to explain NASDAQ’s structure and how it compares
to other trading venues.
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One of the biggest changes is the increase in competition among trading venues.
Equities are no longer restricted to trading on their listing exchange, and this has spurred
entry by new exchanges and other trading venues. Evidence of the increased competition
may be seen in the fact that NASDAQ’s share of dollar volume in 2009 was roughly 36%
in NASDAQ-listed securities and 17% in securities listed on the NYSE.5 The remainder of
U.S. equity trading is spread among trading venues with displayed order books, such as the
NYSE and BATS, and trading venues with non-displayed order books, such as ITG’s POSIT
Marketplace, Credit Suisse’s Crossfinder, and Knight Capital.
A number of papers examine how this competition among various trading venues
affects liquidity. O’Hara and Ye (2011) show that stocks with proportionately more trading
occuring in off-exchange venues have lower spreads. Jovanovic and Menkveld (2010) find
that when an alternative trading venue catering to HFTs, Chi-X, begins trading Euronext
stocks, spreads decline. Foucault and Menkveld (2008) find that market depth increases after
the London Stock Exchange’s entry into the market for Dutch stocks traditionally traded
on Euronext. These recent studies, which focus on entry by trading venues that cater to
electronic trading, build on an existing literature studying competition among trading venues
more generally (e.g., Battalio, Greene, and Jennings 1997, Mayhew 2002).
Another consequence of the increase in trading venues is some degree of market seg-
mentation. Executions in displayed markets predominately come from professional traders.
Few retail orders reach the displayed markets directly. Most retail brokerages have contracts
with market making firms who pay for the right to fill retail orders. For example, in the third
5Appendix Figure A.3 shows the time series of NASDAQ’s market share by listing venue.
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quarter of 2009, Charles Schwab routed more than 90% of its customers’ orders in NYSE-
listed and NASDAQ-listed stocks to UBS’s market making arm for execution (Schwab 2009).
Similarly, E*Trade routed nearly all its customers’ market orders and over half its customers’
limit orders to either Citadel or E*Trade’s market making arms (E*Trade 2009). However,
when there is a large imbalance between retail buy and sell orders in a stock, market making
firms likely offload the imbalance by trading in displayed markets, so there is some interac-
tion between retail trading demand and the displayed markets. This means most trades sent
to NASDAQ come from professional traders.
Another broad theme has been exchanges’ replacement of open outcry trading pits
with electronic limit order books. Even the NYSE is now essentially fully electronic. This
transition to electronic trading seems to have improved liquidity. One line of research utilizes
improvements in exchange trading technology to instrument for increases in automated trad-
ing. Riordan and Storkenmaier (2009) study the effects of an upgrade to the Deutsche Boerse
that reduced latency and find that quoted and effective spreads decline. Hendershott and
Moulton (2011) find that a change to the NYSE’s trading system that improved the speed
of electronic trading and reduced the advantage of floor-based traders relative to electronic
traders increased spreads and improved price efficiency. A general theme in this literature
is that faster trading technology allows electronic market makers to quote narrower spreads,
because they are able to update their quotes faster in response to new information. This shift
towards electronic limit order books also means that NASDAQ, itself an electronic market,
now has essentially the same market structure as all other displayed trading venues.
HFTs are among some of the most active participants on electronic exchanges. HFTs
are typically proprietary trading firms using high-turnover automated trading strategies.
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While estimates of their share of equity trading vary among sources, all estimates indicate
HFTs are a large part of the market. The TABB Group LLC, for example, estimated that
that HFTs accounted for 61% of U.S. Equity share volume in 2009 (Tabb 2009). HFTs are
active outside the U.S. as well, with some estimates suggesting HFTs account for as much as
77% of U.K. trading (Sukumar 2011). Examples of such traders include Tradebot Systems,
Inc., and GETCO. These firms are remarkably active traders. On their websites, Tradebot
says they often account for more than 5% of total U.S. equity trading volume, and GETCO
says they are “among the top 5 participants by volume on many venues, including the CME,
Eurex, NYSE ARCA, NYSE ARCA Options, BATS, NASDAQ, NASDAQ Options, Chi-X,
BrokerTec, and eSpeed” (Tradebot 2010, GETCO 2010). Such firms likely engage in some
combination of market making and statistical arbitrage.
1.3 Data
This study primarily uses intra-day transactions data obtained from the NASDAQ
Stock Market, which covers all equities traded on NASDAQ, including listings from the
NASDAQ, NYSE, AMEX, and ARCA exchanges. The sample period is January 1 through
December 31, 2009.6 This section describes the data and its characteristics.
1.3.1 Identification of high-frequency traders
Trade records on exchanges include a Market Participant Identifier (MPID) indicating
the broker/dealer making the trade. A broker/dealer may have multiple MPIDs that are
used by different business lines or customers. A typical reason for a customer to have
6 I exclude January 27th, because quote data for NYSE-listed stocks is missing.
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their own MPID is they have sponsored access, an arrangement where the customer handles
connectivity with the exchange and typically has limited interaction with the broker/dealer’s
trading system. These MPIDs allow exchanges and regulators to identify which trading firms
execute each trade.
The data from NASDAQ classifies market participants as either an HFT or a non-
HFT. Firms were classified as HFT firms using a variety of qualitative and quantitative
criteria. The firms classified as HFTs typically use low-latency connections and trade more
actively than other investors. Their orders have shorter durations than other investors, and
they show a greater tendency to flip between long and short positions in a stock during a
day.
1.3.2 Sample stocks
The sample stocks are chosen to be representative of those in which actively managed
traditional asset managers invest. The sample is constructed from CRSP common stocks,
identified by stocks having share code 10 or 11. Dual-class stocks are eliminated, because
differences in ticker symbol conventions across databases make matching stock observations
from different databases based on ticker symbols harder for dual-class stocks.7 A reasonable
definition of the set of stocks in which traditional asset managers invest is those in either
the Russell 3000 or the MSCI Investable Market 2500. These indexes contain the top 3,000
and top 2,500 stocks ranked on market capitalization. This roughly corresponds to the top
eight size deciles, so I exclude stocks in the bottom two size deciles from the sample. These
7Appendix Table A.1 summarises stock-day observations of CRSP common stocks with dual-class shares
removed.
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restrictions limit the sample to 2,792 common stocks at the end of 2008. To ensure sample
stocks are fairly liquid, I require average daily dollar volume in December 2008 to be greater
than $1 million and that the stock price at the end of 2008 is greater than $5. These two
liquidity restrictions further reduce the sample universe to 1,882 stocks.8 Another benefit
of the stock price restriction is that it ensures the minimum tick-size is not too large a
percentage of the stock price, which can be important when examining short-term returns.
A large tick-size relative to stock price would require a relatively large change in stock value
for a change in price to occur. From the sample universe of 1,882 stocks, I create the sample
of 96 stocks used in this study by randomly selecting 6 NASDAQ-listed and 6 NYSE-listed
stocks from each of the eight size deciles.
Table 1.1 reports summary statistics for all stock days. Stocks are removed from the
sample any day during which the prior day’s closing price is less than $1. They are perma-
nently removed if daily dollar volume falls below $100,000. Thus, the sample averages 93
stocks per trading day. Market capitalization ranges from $22.1 million to $125,330.6 million.
The median small-cap stock’s price is $14.77, compared to $25.04 for mid-cap stocks and
$31.37 for large-cap stocks. Share and dollar volume increase as market capitalization rises
as well. Median dollar volume for small-cap stocks, for example, is $1.9 million, compared
to $120.2 million for large-cap stocks. As expected, small-cap stocks are more volatile than
mid and large-cap stocks. The standard deviation of small-cap stocks’ daily returns is 4.5%,
compared to 3.5% for mid-cap stocks and 2.5% for large-cap stocks. On average, 27.2% of
the sample stocks’ dollar volume trades on NASDAQ, and this value is fairly constant across
size portfolios.
8Appendix Table A.2 summarises stock-day observations for this sample of stocks.
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HFTs are relatively more active in large-cap stocks. Their median share of total
dollar volume is 14.8% in small-cap stocks, 29.2% in mid-cap stocks, and 40.9% in large-
cap stocks. It is conceivable that since HFTs’ comparative advantage is reacting quickly
to market events, they find more profit opportunities in stocks for which quoted prices and
depths update frequently.
1.3.3 Trade imbalances
The study uses two measures of trade imbalances: marketable imbalances and buy-sell
imbalances. The marketable imbalance is a common measure of buying and selling pressure
from the existing literature (e.g., Chorida, Roll, and Subrahmanyam 2002). The simplest
explanation of marketable imbalances is that they are shares in buyer-initiated trades minus
shares in seller-initiated trades. If investors with resting limit orders in the order book
are passive liquidity suppliers, then the marketable imbalance is an intuitive measure of
trading demand. The buy-sell imbalance is simply shares bought minus shares sold and has
been used to measure position changes of different investor groups (e.g., Griffin, Harris, and
Topaloglu 2003). To put trade imbalances on a similar scale across stocks, I normalize all
imbalance measures by a stock’s 20-day trailing volume from CRSP.
Table 1.2 summarizes trade imbalances for the sample stocks. The table describes the
distribution of the stock-day standard deviations of HFTs’ net buying, their net marketable
buying, their net marketable buying when it is the same direction as their net buying, and
non-HFTs’ net marketable buying. For HFTs’ net marketable buying in the same direction
as their net buying, positive values of HFT net marketable buying are set to zero if net
buying is less than the fourth quintile, and negative values are set to zero if net buying is
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greater than the second quintile. The purpose of the net marketable buying measure that
requires net buying to be in the same direction is that it ensures variation is driven by times
when HFTs are either on net buying and buying aggressively or on net selling and selling
aggressively.
In practice, there is little difference between the two HFT net marketable buying
measures. The mean standard deviation of HFTs’ net buying among all stock days is 83
shares, compared to 80 shares for their net marketable buying and 76 shares for their net
marketable buying when it is the same direction as their net buying. The average standard
deviation of non-HFTs’ net marketable buying, at 125 shares, is somewhat higher than that
of HFTs. Predictably, the standard deviation of the imbalances measures is larger for stocks
with larger market capitalizations. The mean standard deviation of HFTs’ net marketable
buying, for example, is 11 shares in small-cap stocks and 178 shares in large-cap stocks.
1.3.4 Intra-day returns
Intra-day returns are calculated using bid-ask midpoints from two sources. The pri-
mary source for quotes is the National Best Bid and Best Offer (NBBO). The NBBO aggre-
gates quotes from all displayed order books.9 The second source for quotes is the NASDAQ
best bid and best offer (NASDAQ BBO). While the NASDAQ BBO excludes quotes on
other exchanges, it has the advantage that the timestamps are precisely aligned with the
9 The largest displayed order books are the NYSE, NASDAQ, AMEX, Archepelago, BATS, and Direct-
Edge.
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trade data. These quote data are filtered to remove anomalous observations.10
Table 1.2 reports the distribution of the standard deviation of NBBO bid-ask midpoint
returns across all stock days. The mean standard deviation is 0.05% among small-cap stocks,
0.09% among mid-cap stocks, and 0.11% among large-cap stocks. These returns may be
converted to daily standard deviations by mulitiplying them by the square root of the number
of one-second periods in the trading day,
√
6.5× 3600. The mean daily standard deviations of
returns are then 8.01% among small-cap stocks, 13.01% among mid-cap stocks, and 17.44%
among large-cap stocks. These standard deviations seem quite large, but the means are
inflated by volatile stock-day observations.
1.4 Do trades from HFTs lead trades from non-HFTs?
This section begins the examination of whether HFTs anticipate buying and selling
pressure from other investors. HFTs may anticipate the trades of a mutual fund, for instance,
if the mutual fund splits large orders into a series of smaller ones and the initial trades reveal
information about the mutual funds’ future trading intentions. HFTs might also forecast
order flow if traditional asset managers with similar trading demands do not all trade at
the same time, allowing the possibility that the initiation of a trade by one mutual fund
could forecast similar future trades by other mutual funds. If an HFT were able to forecast
a traditional asset managers’ order flow by either these or some other means, then the
HFT could potentially trade ahead of them and profit from the traditional asset manager’s
10 I remove quote updates where the bid is greater than the ask or where the bid-ask spread is more than
20% greater than the bid-ask midpoint. To remedy bad pre-market quotes in the NYSE data, the last of
which is used to proxy for the opening price, I throw out the last price before the open if there is more than
a 20% difference between the last pre-open bid-ask midpoint and the first post-open bid-ask midpoint.
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subsequent price impact.
There are two main empirical implications of HFTs engaging in such a trading strat-
egy. The first implication is that HFT trading should lead non-HFT trading—if an HFT buys
a stock, non-HFTs should subsequently come into the market and buy those same stocks.
Second, the HFT’s whole objective is to profit from the non-HFT’s subsequent price impact,
so it must be the case that HFT trades precede profitable price changes. These two patterns,
together, are consistent with HFTs trading stocks in order to profit from non-HFTs’ future
buying and selling pressure.
Table 1.4 reports results from tests of the above hypothesis using portfolio sorts.
The table reports average non-HFT net marketable buying for stocks sorted on HFTs’ net
marketable buying. Stocks are sorted into deciles at time t based on HFT net marketable
buying in the same direction as net buying. Decile breakpoints are calculated from non-zero
observations during the prior trading day. The results are reported for all stocks as well
as separately for small, mid, and large-cap stocks. Non-HFTs’ net marketable buying is
averaged across all observations for a day, and the mean of the daily time series is reported
in the table. Parentheses indicate Newey and West (1994) t-statistics for the time-series
means.
The results show that HFT net marketable buying is positively correlated with lagged,
contemporaneous, and future net marketable buying from non-HFTs. In small-cap stocks, in
the thirty seconds before the sort period, investment fund net marketable buying is -1.12 for
stocks sold aggressively by HFTs and 1.11 for stocks bought aggressively. Going forward, in
the five minutes after the sort, non-HFT net marketable buying is -3.22 times the one-second
standard deviation of net marketable buying in the stocks sold aggressively and 2.55 times
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the one-second standard deviation in the stocks bought aggressively. The patterns are the
same in mid and large-cap stocks, though the magnitude of non-HFT net marketable buying
declines as market capitalization increases.
The top panel in Figure 1.1 shows this relationship in graphical form. The figure plots
cumulative net marketable buying for HFTs and for non-HFTs for stocks in net marketable
buying portfolios one and ten. The portfolios are formed in the same way as they are in
Table 1.4. The figure shows that at time zero, the sort period, net marketable buying spikes
for both investor groups. Afterwards, net marketable buying for HFTs is relatively flat,
whereas for non-HFTs, cumulative net marketable buying continues to increase in portfolio
ten and fall in portfolio one. The figure clearly shows that HFTs’ net marketable buying
leads net marketable buying from non-HFTs.
Table 1.4 and Figure 1.1 show that HFTs’ net marketable buying leads future net
marketable buying by other investors. If HFTs make these trades in anticipation of non-
HFT buying and selling pressure, then we should also see that the stocks that are bought
aggressively have postive future returns and that the stocks that are sold aggressivley have
negative future returns.
The top panel in Figure 1.2 shows returns for stocks in HFT net marketable buying
portfolios one and ten around the sort period. The figure shows that stocks bought aggres-
sively by HFTs subsequently have positive returns, while those sold aggressively subsequently
have negative returns. These post-sort return patterns are likely caused by the buying and
selling pressure from non-HFTs illustrated in Figure 1.1.
Table 1.5 reports the magnitude of these returns across all stocks and for each size
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portfolio. Thirty seconds after the sort period, basis point returns for small-cap stocks that
were bought versus sold are 2.54 versus -2.59, compared to 1.52 and -1.28 for mid-cap stocks
and 0.41 and -0.14 for large-cap stocks. These returns are all significantly different from zero,
though the magnitude of small and mid-cap stocks’ post-sort returns and t-stats are much
larger than those of large-cap stocks. Since small-cap stocks are generally more illiquid, they
may provide a greater opportunity for predicting price pressure. By five minutes after the
sort period, prices of large-cap stocks sold by HFTs are actually higher than at the end of
the sort period, and prices of the stocks they bought are essentially the same as at the end
of the sort period. Cumulative returns for large-cap stocks that were bought versus sold
aggressively are 0.08 versus 0.67. However, in small and mid-cap stocks, cumulative returns
for stocks that were bought aggressively remain positive, and returns of stocks that were sold
aggressively remain negative. Cumulative returns in the five-minutes after the sort period for
small cap stocks that were bought versus sold aggressively are 1.32 versus -2.71, compared
to 1.17 versus -0.34 for mid-cap stocks. Figure 1.3 illustrates post-sort returns across size
portfolios in more detail. The figure indicates that the reversal in large-cap stocks begins
immediately after the initial post-sort price change. Small and mid-cap stocks that were
bought aggressively continue to briefly rise after they are bought aggressively and fall after
they are sold aggressively by HFTs. By about fifty seconds after the sort period, prices of
small and mid-cap stocks begin to partially reverse. These return patterns, in combination
with the patterns in net marketable buying shown in Table 1.4 and Figure 1.1, are consistent




Section 1.4 presented results showing HFT trades lead trades from non-HFTs as well
as returns. While these findings are consistent with HFTs anticipating buying and selling
pressure, there are other potential explanations for these results. This section tests several
alternative explanations for why HFT net marketable buying leads non-HFT net marketable
buying.
1.5.1 Controlling for serial correlation and returns
This section evaluates two alternative explanations for the lead-lag relationship be-
tween HFT and non-HFT net marketable buying. The first alternative is that HFT and
non-HFT trading might be driven by the same serially correlated process, in which case HFT
trading predicts non-HFT trading because it is a noisy proxy for lagged non-HFT trading.
This might be the case if, for example, HFTs and non-HFTs use the same trading signals.
If this explanation is driving the lead-lag relationship between HFT and non-HFT trading,
then the lead-lag relationship between the two variables will go away after controlling for
lagged non-HFT trading. A second alternative is that the lead-lag relationship between HFT
and non-HFT trading is due to a predictable relationship with past returns. This is essen-
tially a reverse causality story. If non-HFTs follow trend-chasing strategies, then purchases
by HFTs could actually cause future non-HFT trading through their effect on returns. This
explanation predicts that HFT trading will be uncorrelated with future non-HFT trading
after controlling for lagged returns. This section controls for these confounding effects using
vector autoregressions (VAR).
The VAR is a system of three equations in which lags of returns, HFT net marketable
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buying, and non-HFT net marketable buying are all used to explain each other. The equation
with non-HFTs’ net marketable buying as the dependent variable is the primary focus.
This equation isolates the predictive ability of HFTs’ aggressive trades, controlling for serial
correlation in non-HFTs’ net marketable buying and past returns.
The VAR is estimated separately for each stock every day and includes ten lags of
each variable. All variables are divided by their standard deviation among all stocks for
that day to ease interpretation. Panel A in Table 1.6 summarizes coefficient estimates from
these VARs. The panel reports the average of each coefficient as well as the percent that
are positive or negative and significant. This is a simple way to summarise the VAR results,
but it does not distinguish between effects that are consistent across days and effects that
exist on only a few days. To check the consistency of effects across days, I also calculate
the mean of each coefficient every day, and perform a t-test on the time-series mean of daily
mean coefficients. These results are reported in Panel B.
This section is motivated by concerns about the confounding effects of serial corre-
lation and trend-chasing by non-HFTs. If these effects are present, then the coefficients on
lagged non-HFT net marketable buying and lagged returns in the equation where non-HFT
net marketable is the dependent variable will be positive. Indeed, the coefficients on lagged
non-HFT net-marketable buying are positive, indicating positive serial correlation. Coeffi-
cients on lagged non-HFT net marketable buying decline from 0.074 at lag one to 0.012 at
lag ten.11 All coefficients are more likely to be positive and significant than negative and sig-
11 High-frequency traders’ net marketable buying is also serially correlated, though to a lesser degree than
non-HFTs’. A one standard deviation increase in HFT net marketable buying leads to a 0.026 standard
deviation increase in the same variable the next period. Coefficients decline with additional lags to 0.001 at
lag 10.
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nificant, and the time-series means of average daily coefficients are all significantly different
from zero, with t-statistics ranging from 27.63 to 41.18. Turning to returns, the coefficient
on lag one returns is the largest of all those in the VAR specification. A one standard de-
viation increase in returns leads to a 0.86 standard deviation increase in the next period’s
non-HFT net marketable buying imbalance. Coefficients on returns at lags two through ten
are much smaller. The large positive coefficient on lag one returns suggests non-HFTs are
trend-chasing at short horizons.12,13 In summary, the coefficients on lagged non-HFT trad-
ing and lagged returns in Table 1.6 show controls for serial correlation and trend chasing by
non-HFTs are warranted.
The main question, then, is whether HFT net marketable buying is still correlated
with future non-HFT net marketable buying after these controls. In fact, as was the case
for the portfolio sorts in Table 1.4, HFT net marketable buying is positively correlated with
future net marketable buying from other investors in Table 1.6. A one standard deviation
increase in HFT net marketable buying on average leads to a 0.0023 standard deviation
change in non-HFT net marketable buying the next period.14 The lag one coefficient is
positive and significant 24.92 percent of the time and negative and significant 16.59 percent
12Other interpretations include market makers anticipating a forthcoming net marketable imbalance and
adjust prices accordingly or traders submitting aggressive limit orders prior to submitting marketable orders,
thereby moving the bid-ask midpoint in the direction of future marketable trades.
13 One concern might be that the apparent trend-chasing behavior could be driven by misaligning trade
and NBBO quote time-stamps. Appendix Table A.5, which uses NQBBO quotes, shows using precisely
aligned timestamps does not change any of these conclusions.
14 There is also short-horizon correlation between non-HFT net marketable buying and future HFT net
marketable buying. When HFT net marketable buying is the dependent variable, the lag one coefficient on
non-HFT net marketable buying is 0.005 and positive and significant 22.9 percent of the time. The lead-
lag relationship is less persistent than that between HFT net marketable buying and future non-HFT net
marketable buying—by lag five, the coefficients are much smaller and the time-series means of the coefficients
in Panel B are not consistently significantly different from zero.
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of the time. The average coefficient on lags two through ten declines slowly, to a minimum of
0.0016 at lag ten.15 The lag two through ten coefficients are between 1.7 and 2.1 times more
likely to be positive and significant than negative and significant. Panel B shows that the
time-series of daily means is positive and significantly different from zero at all lags. These
findings indicate aggressive buying by HFTs is followed by aggressive buying by non-HFTs,
and vice versa for aggressive selling, even after controlling for past returns and past non-HFT
aggressive buying.
Similarly, the results for the relationship between HFT net marketable buying and
future returns is the same as in the sorts in Section 1.4. A one-standard deviation increase in
lag one HFT net marketable buying leads to a 0.018 standard deviation increase in the next
period return. The coefficient is much more likely to be positive and significant than negative
and significant, and the time-series mean of the daily average coefficients are significantly
different from zero. Coefficients on additional lags of HFT net marketable buying are also
positive, though by lag ten they are no longer significantly different from zero.
The economic magnitude of the individual coefficients on HFTs’ net marketable buy-
ing looks small at first glance. But the important thing is the effect of a shock to HFT
net marketable buying on non-HFT net marketable buying accumulated over all lags. This
cumulative effect can be determined by calculating impulse response functions.
Figure 1.4 uses impulse response functions to plot the response of non-HFT net mar-
ketable buying to a one standard deviation shock to HFT net marketable buying. Impulse
15Appendix Figure A.4, which plots coefficients for the VAR using thirty lags, shows that the coefficients
on HFT net marketable buying continue to decline towards zero at higher lags.
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response functions are first calculated for all stocks separately each day.16 The stock-day
impulse response functions are then averaged across all stocks on a day to create a time-series
of daily cross-sectional average impulse response functions. The figure plots the time-series
mean of the daily cross-sectional impulse response functions as well a 95% confidence in-
terval calculated using standard errors from the daily time series of mean impulse response
functions. The figure indicates the average cumulative effect on non-HFT net marketable
buying after thirty seconds is 0.052 times the one-second standard deviation.
An additional point to note is that HFTs also exhibit short horizon trend chasing.
Coefficients in Table 1.6 on returns at lags one through four are positive, while those on lags
five through ten are negative. A one standard deviation increase in returns leads to a 1.631
standard deviation increase in HFT net marketable buying the next period. The coefficient
is positive and significant 85.6 percent of the time. Coefficients on lags two through four are
0.034, 0.001, and -0.007. Coefficients five through ten are negative, though only lags eight,
nine, and ten have time-series means of daily coefficients that are significantly different from
zero. These results indicate HFTs chase very short-term price trends, but at longer horizons
they are contrarian.
This section used a VAR framework to test whether HFT trading leads non-HFT
trading because either HFT trading is a noisy proxy for serially correlated non-HFT trading
or non-HFTs are chasing returns caused by HFT trades. Consistent with the sort results in
16The impulse response function is orthogonalized to allow for contemporanous effects among the variables.
Contemporaneous effects are included, because HFT and non-HFT trading affect contemporaneous returns.
The calculation is structured such that HFT net marketable buying has a contemporaneous effect on non-
HFT net marketable buying and returns, non-HFT net marketable buying has a contemporaneous effect on
returns, and returns do not have a contemporaneous effect on either of the trading variables.
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Section 1.4, HFT trading is positively correlated with future non-HFT trading in the VAR
specification. Thus, the explanations examined in this section do not appear to be driving
the lead-lag relationship between HFT and non-HFT trading.
1.5.2 Excluding trading around news events
Another alternative explanation for the finding that HFT net marketable buying
leads non-HFT net marketable buying is that HFTs simply react to news faster than other
investors. To rule out this alternative hypothesis, I reexamine the sort and VAR results after
excluding periods around news announcements. First, I redo the sorts after excluding the five
minutes before and after intra-day news announcements. Next, I examine VAR estimates on
days with and without news, where a news day is alternately defined as either a day when
a news article about the stock is published or a day when the absolute value of a stock’s
return is greater than two percent. All three methods indicate the lead-lag relationship
between HFT and non-HFT trading is not attributable to HFTs simply reacting faster to
news announcements.
The news articles used in this section were collected from the Factiva news archive.
The Factiva archive is remarkably complete. Factiva contains news from over 35,000 sources,
including most major newswires, newpapers, and magazines. Factiva tags articles with
identifiers indicating which firms are covered in an article, and these identifiers are used to
match articles to the firms in this study’s sample.
Table 1.3 describes the sample of news articles. The are an average of 762 articles
per stock, and the average number of days a stock has an article about it published is 130.
All articles contain the date an article is published, but some also include a time stamp for
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the article. The sample of articles with time stamps is somewhat smaller and predominately
consists of newswires. If the sample of articles is restricted to those with time stamps occuring
during the trading day, the number of articles per stock and days with news fall to 70 and
29. Panel B reports the top sources for time-stamped articles, and, not surprisingly, the list
consists entirely of newswires.
The first test reexamines the sort results in Table 1.4 after excluding periods that are
within five minutes of a minute during which an article about the stock is published. Doing
so restricts the news sample to articles with timestamps. This restriction unfortunately
removes news that is only revealed in articles without time stamps, but if a news article
contains timely information on which investors will immediately trade, then the news should
be picked up by newswires, which contain timestamps and so are in the sample. Panel B in
Table 1.4 reports sorts of non-HFT net marketable buying after periods near intra-day news
are removed, and the results are nearly identical to those in Panel A. Similarly, Panel B
in Figure 1.1, which excludes trading in periods near news announcements, shows the same
pattern as the full sample. Thus, the sorts provide no evidence that the lead-lag relationship
between HFT and non-HFT trading is driven by HFTs reacting faster to news.
However, excluding trading in the five minutes before and after Factiva news articles
may not be sufficient to exclude all news trading events. This methodology will miss trading
around news events if either Factiva timestamps are wrong or if Factiva doesn’t include all
types of news. To address the possibility that Factiva timestamps might be wrong, I estimate
the VAR from Table 1.6 after excluding a stock any day a news article about it is published.
To address the possibility that HFTs are reacting faster than non-HFTs to news that isn’t
in Factiva (e.g., analyst forecasts), I also estimate the VAR excluding stocks any day when
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the absolute value of the stock’s return is greater than two percent. The idea is that extreme
returns are a proxy for news that captures events missing from standard databases.
Panel A in Table 1.7 reports VAR estimates for days with and without stock news,
where news is defined as articles in the Factiva news archive. The panel reports estimates
for coefficients on lags of HFT net marketable buying in regressions where the dependent
variable is non-HFT net marketable buying. The primary focus is determining whether
coefficients on lags of non-HFT net marketable buying are positive after excluding trading
on days with news. The middle columns contain estimates for non-news days. The average
non-news day lag one coefficient on HFT net marketable buying is 0.0027 and, with a t-
statistic of 7.06, significantly different from zero. Lags two through ten and the sum of all
ten lags are also positive and significantly different from zero. In general, the coefficients on
news and non-news days are similar and not significantly different from each other. These
results are consistent with HFT net marketable buying forecasting non-HFT net marketable
buying on days when there is no news for a stock.
Panel B has the same structure, except news days are defined as days when the
absolute value of a stock’s market-adjusted return is greater than one percent. The coefficient
estimates on days with small returns are all positive and significantly different from zero.
These findings are inconsistent with the hypothesis that the lead-lag relationship between
HFT and non-HFT trading is driven by trading on news events that are not in Factiva.
This section tested whether the explanation for why HFT trading forecasts non-HFT
trading is that HFTs react faster than non-HFTs to news announcements. I identified trading
during times with no news in three different ways, and in all three cases, HFT net marketable
buying remains positively correlated with future non-HFT net marketable buying. These
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findings are inconsistent with the lead-lag relationship between HFT and non-HFT trading
being driven by HFTs reacting faster to news announcements.
1.5.3 Inventory management
Inventory management is another potential explanation for HFT trading leading non-
HFT trading. This explanation implies that HFTs happen to dispose of inventory positions
accumulated in the process of making markets immediately before non-HFT buying and
selling pressure.
A counter argument is the only way for HFTs to systematically dispose of inventory
positions immediately prior to adverse price moves caused by non-HFT buying and selling
pressure is if the HFTs anticipate the impending non-HFT trading. Inventory management
based on anticipated adverse price changes caused by non-HFT trading is the same as HFTs
trading ahead of anticipated non-HFT order flow.
Another way to address this alternative is to examine whether there is evidence HFTs
build inventory positions prior to their aggressive trades. Figure 1.5 plots cumulative HFT
net buying for the first and tenth net marketable buying portfolios in Table 1.4 from 60
minutes before to 60 minutes after the sort period. If HFTs’ trades in the sort period are
unwinding previous positions accumulated while making markets, then for the stocks HFTs
are buying aggressively at time zero, one would expect them to have previously been net
sellers of those stocks. If this is going on, then in the figure, the dotted line indicating net
position changes for stocks HFTs sell aggressively at time zero should rise, and the solid line
indicating position changes for stocks HFTs buy at time zero should fall. The lines in the
hour before the sort period are mostly flat and close to zero, providing no evidence HFTs
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are building inventory positions that they later dispose of at time zero.
Another way to evaluate whether HFTs are building inventory positions in the pre-sort
period that offset their trades in the sort period is to look at returns. The HFT net buying
measure is calculated from NASDAQ data, so it is possible the calculation misses inventory
positions being built on other trading venues. Inferences based on returns, illustrated in the
bottom panel of Figure 1.5, do not have this problem. If sales during the sort period are
disposing of shares acquired due to liquidity provision during the prior 60 minutes, then one
would expect negative returns during the prior 60 minutes. But returns from 60 minutes
to 1 minute before aggressive HFT sales are positive, which is not what one would expect
if HFTs were providing buy-size liquidity during that period. The returns for stocks HFTs
buy aggressively at time zero are analogous. Thus, the HFT net buying and return patterns
in the 60 minutes before the sort period do not support the hypothesis that the HFT trades
at time zero are disposing of inventory positions built in the prior 60 minutes in the course
of providing liquidity. Therefore, there seems to be little support for the argument that the
lead-lag relationship between HFT and non-HFT trading is caused by inventory management
that is not triggered by HFTs anticipating price changes caused by future non-HFT buying
and selling pressure.
1.6 Why is non-HFT order flow predictable?
One explanation for why HFT trades forecast non-HFT trades is HFTs are able to
model non-HFT order flow as a function of past returns and quotes. This section explores
this explanation by examining the extent to which non-HFT order flow may be predicted by a
simple linear model of past returns and bid-ask depth imbalances. Past returns could predict
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future non-HFT order flow if non-HFTs chase price trends, follow return reversal strategies,
or have persistent order flow that causes price impact. The bid-ask imbalance could predict
future order flow if, for instance, a large bid size relative to the ask size indicates pent up
buying demand from non-HFTs.
Table 1.8 reports results from these tests. Panel A displays results from regressions
in which non-HFT net marketable buying is alternately regressed on four lags of the bid-ask
quote imbalance, returns, HFT net marketable buying in the same direction as net buying,
and non-HFT net marketable buying. Subsequent panels examine regressions including
various combinations of these lagged variables.
The hypothesis that a positive bid-ask imbalance might reflect built up buying pres-
sure implies positive coefficients on lags of the bid-ask quote imbalance in the first regression
in Panel A. While coefficients on the second and third lags of the bid-ask imbalance are posi-
tive and significantly different from zero, the coefficient on the first lag is negative, significant,
and much larger than the coefficients on the other lags. This negative coefficient contradicts
the hypothesis that a positive bid-ask imbalance forecasts future non-HFT buying pressure.
There are a couple possible explanations for the negative lag one coefficient in regres-
sion one. One reason a small bid size relative to the ask size might forecast buying pressure
is if the small bid indicates the bid was just raised. A second possibility is that the small bid
could mean limit buy orders at the best bid were just cancelled and are being switched to
marketable buy orders. Regardless the explanation, the low average adjusted R2 relative to
the other regressions in Panel A indicates the bid-ask size imbalance is a fairly weak predictor
of non-HFT net marketable buying.
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Returns turn out to be a better predictor of non-HFT net marketable buying. Coeffi-
cients on all four lags of returns in regression two are positive and significant, and the average
adjusted R2, 0.0006, is much larger than that of the bid-ask size imbalance regression. Since
non-HFT net marketable buying is serially correlated, as indicated in regression four, and
likely to cause price impact, it is possible the predictability picked up by past returns is due
only to price impact from past non-HFT net marketable buying. Regression six in Panel B,
which adds non-HFT net marketable buying as a control, shows that much of the predictive
power of returns is independent of the information in past non-HFT net marketable buying.
The fact that the predictive power of lagged returns and lagged non-HFT net marketable
buying are independent can be seen by the fact that the adjusted R2 in regression six is
nearly the sum of the adjusted R2 in regressions two and four. Thus, returns seem a good
candidate for the foundation of a model used by HFTs to predict non-HFT net marketable
buying. If HFTs mainly use returns to predict non-HFT net marketable buying, then re-
turns and HFT net marketable buying will largely contain redundent information. In other
words, adding HFT net marketable buying to regression two will not meaningfully increase
the adjusted R2 if they contain redundant information. In fact, as regression five shows,
the adjusted R2 from the regression having both returns and HFT net marketable buying
is nearly the sum of the adjusted R2 in regressions two and three, indicating much of the
preditive ability of HFT net marketable buying is independent of that in returns. Similarly,
regression eight shows that the contribution of HFT net marketable buying and returns to
the adjusted R2 relative to the regression with only lags of non-HFT net marketable buying,
regression four, is the same as the sum of the marginal contributions of the two variables in
regressions six and seven.
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Table 1.8 reports regressions testing the hypothesis that returns and the lagged bid-
ask quote size imbalance predict non-HFT net marketable buying and that the information in
these variables is correlated with the information in lagged HFT net marketable buying. The
results show that while the bid-ask quote size imbalance is correlated with future non-HFT
net marketable buying, the correlation is opposite that expected and the explanatory power
of the variable is orders of magnitude smaller than that of returns and HFT net marketable
buying. It turns out that returns and HFT net marketable buying have similar predictive
power, but the variation explained by returns is fairly independent of the variation explained
by HFT net marketable buying. Thus, while returns in part explain future non-HFT net
marketable buying, much of the predictive power of HFT net marketable buying comes from
something other than returns.
1.7 Conditioning on times when HFTs are likely to be impatient
Prior sections demonstrated that HFT net marketable buying leads both non-HFT
net marketable buying and returns. These findings suggest HFTs are able to anticipate and
trade ahead of order flow from non-HFTs. If this is true, then perhaps it may be easier to
anticipate non-HFT trades when non-HFTs are relatively impatient. This section uses three
methods for identifying times when non-HFTs are hypothesized to be relatively impatient
and examines whether HFT trades are more strongly correlated with future trades from
non-HFTs at these times.
The methodology involves comparing estimates of the VAR in section 1.5.1 at times
when non-HFTs are hypothesized to be relatively impatient to estimates from normal times.
The focus is comparing the size of coefficients on lagged HFT net marketable buying in the
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regression where the dependent variable is non-HFT net marketable buying. Larger positive
coefficients at times when non-HFTs are hypothesized to be impatient are consistent with
HFTs having an easier time anticipating order flow.
1.7.1 VAR estimates near the market open and close
The first set of tests uses the open and close of trading to instrument for times when
non-HFTs are impatient. To see why investors might be impatient at the open, imagine
an investor who receives a signal overnight. The investor knows that either other investors
received the same signal or will receive it shortly. Therefore, the investor knows they need
to trade early in order to profit from that information. Investors may be impatient near the
close for related reasons. An investor may need to trade a position before the close, because
a) they have private information about an impending news announcement or b) they are
facing a liquidity shock. If non-HFTs are more impatient at the open or the close, then I
expect HFTs will have an easier time forecasting their order flow.
Table 1.9 reports results comparing trading in the first and last half hours of the
trading day to trading in the middle of the day. Panel A looks at results for the first half
hour of the trading day. The average coefficient on the first lag of HFT net marketable
buying during the morning is 0.0040, compared to 0.0012 in the middle of the trading day.
The difference is significantly different from zero, with a t-statistic of 6.05 In fact, all the
coefficients are larger in the morning than in the middle of the trading day. One way to get a
sense for the overall difference is to look at the sum of the coefficients on all ten lags of HFT
net marketable buying. The sum of all lags in the morning is 0.0224, compared to 0.0147 in
the middle of the day. These results indicate HFT net marketable buying is more strongly
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correlated with future non-HFT net marketable buying in the morning than in the middle
of the trading day.
Panel B examines results during the last half hour of the trading day. In contrast to
earlier results, the coefficient on the first lag of HFT net marketable buying near the close
is negative, −0.0029. The median of the daily mean coefficients, −0.0030, is also negative
and close to the mean, indicating the result is not driven by an outlier. The difference with
the average coefficient in the middle of the day, −0.0041, is significantly different from zero,
with a t-statistic of −8.87. Coefficients on the next few lags of HFT net marketable buying,
though positive, are also less than those in the middle of the trading day. Thus, HFT net
marketable buying at the close does not exhibit a stronger positive correlation with non-HFT
net marketable buying than that during the middle of the trading day.
The results in the morning are consistent with non-HFTs being more impatient at
the open, making it easier for HFTs to forecast their order flow. However, the results at the
close are inconsistent with the hypothesis that HFTs are better able to forecast order flow.
There is something different about the close. One possibility is that HFTs are less aggressive
near the close, because they do not want to build an inventory position that they do not
have time to dispose of before the close. This explains weaker effects at the close, but not
the negative coefficient on the first lag of HFT net marketable buying. An explanation for
the negative coefficient could be that HFTs still anticipate order flow, but that rather than
selling aggressively in anticipation of selling pressure, they buy aggressively to dispose of an
inventory position. That said, this explanation for the negative coefficient on the first lag of
HFT net marketable buying near the close is not fully satisfying.
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1.7.2 VAR estimates on high volume and high imbalance days
High volume days are another possible time when non-HFTs might be more impatient.
High volume days are likely days when certain investors are trading large postions. When an
investor needs to trade a large position, it is potentially harder for them to hide with noise
traders. In other words, they may stick out more, making it easier for HFTs to forecast their
order flow. Thus, high volume or large marketable imablance days could be used to identify
days when a non-HFT is impatient because they are trading a large position.
Table 1.10 compares VAR estimates on high volume or high imbalance days to normal
days. As in section 1.7.1, the coefficients being compared are those on lags of HFT net mar-
ketable buying from the equation where the dependent variable is non-HFT net marketable
buying. High volume and high imbalance days are identified using a methodology similar to
that of Gervais, Kaniel, and Mingelgrin (2001). A day’s CRSP volume or the absolute value
of the day’s aggregate net marketable buying imbalance is ranked relative to the prior 19
trading days. If the day’s rank is among the two highest during the 20-day ranking period,
then the day is marked a high volume or high imbalance day. All other days are considered
normal days.17
Panel A examines high volume days, and Panel B examines high imbalance days. Both
panels tell a similar story. The coefficient on the first lag of HFT net marketable buying
is 0.0049 on high volume days and 0.0016 on normal volume days. The 0.0033 difference
between the two is significantly different from zero, with a t-statistic of 4.27. The next few
lags on high volume days remain higher than those on normal volume days, but at higher lags
17The volume and imbalance rankings are completely independent of each other, so a normal volume day
in the volume tests, for example, could be a high imbalance day in the imbalance tests.
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there is no significant difference between the coefficients on high volume and normal volume
days. Similarly, Panel B shows that on high imbalance days, the coefficient on the first lag
of HFT net marketable buying is 0.0036, which is 0.0018 higher than on normal imbalance
days. The t-statistic from the test that the two coefficients are equal is 2.48, indicating we
can reject the hypothesis that there is no difference between the two. Looking at the sum of
all ten lags, the difference between the sums on high-volume days and normal volume days
is significantly different from zero, but the t-statistic from the test of the difference between
the sum of all lags on high imbalance and normal imbalance days is only 1.89. Overall, there
appears to be a stronger correlation between HFT net marketable buying and future net
marketable buying by non-HFTs on both high volume and high imbalance days.
1.7.3 VAR estimates in high versus low spread stocks
HFTs may also have an easier time forecasting order flow in illiquid stocks. The
intuition is that if non-HFTs do not perfectly scale position sizes relative to liquidity, then in
illiquid stocks, they will have larger relative positions than in liquid stocks. When non-HFTs
trading illiquid stocks enter and exit these larger relative positions, it may be harder to hide
future trading demand than would be the case in liquid stocks (i.e., it is harder to hide when
one is a bigger part of the market).
Table 1.11 tests this hypothesis by comparing VAR estimates of how strongly HFT
net marketable buying is correlated with future net marketable buying from non-HFTs in
high bid-ask spread versus low bid-ask spread stocks. Bid-ask spreads are calculated in two
ways: Panel A uses bid-ask spreads, while Panel B uses relative bid-ask spreads, which are
spreads divided by the bid-ask midpoint. Normal bid-ask spreads are in some ways more
34
intuitive, but they do not account for the fact that liquid high-priced stocks may have wide
nominal spreads. In dividing by the bid-ask midpoint, relative spreads address this issue.
The results for spreads and relative spreads both indicate the correlation between
HFT net marketable buying and future non-HFT net marketable buying is stronger in illiquid
stocks. The lag one coefficient in high-spread stocks is 0.0053, compared to 0.0000 in low-
spread stocks. The difference between these coefficients is statistically significant, with a
t-statistic of 11.18. The sum of coefficients on lags one through ten is also larger for high
versus low spread stocks. Similarly, the lag one coefficient for high relative spread stocks is
0.0046, is higher than the lag one coefficient in low relative spread stocks, 0.0012. The sum
of coefficients on the first ten lags in high relative spread stocks, 0.0214, is also higher than
that in low relative spread stocks, 0.0179. As was the case in Panel A, it is really the case
that coefficients only on the first few lags of HFT net marketable buying are higher in high
spread stocks. These results are consistent with HFTs being able to better forecast non-HFT
order flow in illiquid stocks.
1.8 Cross-sectional differences in prediction ability
Prior results indicate aggregate HFT net marketable buying leads non-HFT net mar-
ketable buying. It is possible that among HFTs, some firms’ trades are strongly correlated
with future non-HFT order flow, while other firms’ trades have little or no correlation with
non-HFT order flow. This may be the case if certain HFTs focus more on strategies that
anticipate order flow or if some HFTs are more skilled than other firms. To examine this
issue, this section tests whether trades from HFTs whose trades are most strongly corre-
lated with future non-HFT order flow in one month continue to have higher than average
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correlation with future non-HFT order flow in future months. The advantage of looking at
the question in this way, that is, in looking at persistence in the ability to predict buying
and selling pressure rather than looking at full sample cross-sectional differences in ability,
is that it accounts for the fact that in any given period, some HFTs will look better than
others due to chance.
High-frequency traders’ ability to predict buying and selling pressure is calculated
using regressions similar to those used in the VAR analysis in section 1.5.1. Each day,
for each HFT, I estimate two regressions. In the first regression, I regress non-HFT net
marketable buying on ten lags of the HFT’s net marketable buying, ten lags of non-HFT net
marketable buying, and ten lags of returns. High-frequency traders’ net marketable buying is
required to be in the same direction as their net buying in the stock; If the HFT’s net buying
is negative when net buying is positive, or net buying is positive when net marketable buying
is negative, then net marketable buying for the period is set to zero. Returns and non-HFT
net marketable buying are divided by their standard deviation, and HFTs’ net marketable
buying is divided by the standard deviation of aggregate HFT net marketable buying that
day. The second regression is the same, except the HFT’s net buying is substituted for their
net marketable buying. The heading for Table 1.12 contains the regression equation.
High-frequency traders’ ability to predict buying and selling pressure is measured
in two ways: first, by the average coefficient on the first lag of the HFT’s net marketable
buying or net buying, and, second, by the average sum of the coefficients on all ten lags of
their net marketable buying or net buying. A positive coefficient means the HFT’s trades
are positively correlated with future non-HFT order flow. I take the mean of each ability
measure across all days in a month for each HFT and sort the sample into three groups based
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on the magnitude of the HFTs’ ability measures.
One simple way to look at persistence is to look at the probably an HFT in the highest
correlation group remains in that group in future months. Figure 1.6 plots the probability an
HFT who is in the highest-correlation group will again be in the highest-correlation group
one, two, and three months later. Since there are three groups, if being in the highest-
correlation group is random, then the probably a firm that was in highest-correlation group
one month will be in the highest-correlation group the next month is 33.3%. So under the
null hypothesis of no persistent difference among HFTs, in the first month after the sort
period, only 33.3% of the HFTs should still be in the highest-correlation group. In fact,
regardless whether HFTs are sorted by only the first or by all lags of HFT net marketable
buying or net buying, between 57% and 78% of the HFTs are still in the highest-correlation
group one month later. This simple test illustrates that some HFTs’ trades are consistently
more strongly correlated with non-HFT order flow than are trades from other HFTs.
Another way to examine persistence is to compare post-sort month ability measures
for the three HFT groups. If the ability measures are persistent, then the highest-correlation
group should continue to have larger average coefficients than the lowest-correlation group
in the post-sort month. Table 1.12 reports average post-sort month ability measures for the
three HFT groups. Results for regressions using HFTs’ net marketable buying are in the
first three columns and those for regressions using HFTs’ net buying are in the last three
columns.
The results in Table 1.12 indicate there are persistent differences among HFTs in both
the correlation between their net marketable buying and non-HFTs’ future net marketable
buying and the correlation between their net buying and non-HFTs’ future net marketable
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buying. The first group of columns in the top half of the table examine the persistence of the
coefficient on the first lag of HFTs’ net marketable buying, γd,t,1. The average γd,t,1 for the
highest-correlation group is 0.014, compared to 0.002 for the lowest-correlation group. The
p-value from a test of the hypothesis that the the time-series of monthly differences between
the two groups equals zero is 0.006, indicating the difference between the two groups is
persistent. The first three columns in the bottom half of Table 1.12 show results using ten
lags of HFTs’ net marketable buying, rather than just the first lag. The average sums of
the first ten lags are greater than the average first lags for all three groups, indicating lags
two through ten are on average positive. As was the case for the test using just the first
lag, the difference between the highest and lowest-correlation groups in the post-sort month
is significantly different from zero. The last three columns in Table 1.12 report results from
the tests using HFTs’ net buying rather than net marketable buying. The results from these
tests are the same as for the net marketable buying tests—there are persistent differences
between the highest and lowest-correlation groups. One may conclude from these results
that trades from some HFTs are more correlated with future order flow than are trades from
other HFTs.
1.9 Conclusion
This study examines the relationship between high-frequency traders’ aggressive trades
and future order flow from other investors. I find that aggressive buying of a stock by HFTs
predicts future aggressive buying by non-HFTs, and aggressive selling by HFTs predicts fu-
ture aggressive selling by non-HFTs. This finding is consistent with HFTs trading ahead of
anticipated price changes caused by non-HFTs’ future buying and selling pressure. I explore
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several alternative explanations for these findings, including their being driven by serial cor-
relation in non-HFT order flow, non-HFTs chasing return trends, HFTs reacting faster than
non-HFTs to news, and inventory management. However, the anticipatory trading hypothe-
sis proves robust to all these alternative explanations. In addition, I examine whether there
are differences among HFTs in how well their trades forecast future order flow. There are,
in fact, persistent differences among HFTs in terms of how well their trades forecast future
buying and selling pressure. These findings suggest HFTs trade on forecasted price changes
caused by buying and selling pressure from traditional asset managers.
These findings have implications for price efficiency and stock liquidity. If HFTs
anticipate and trade ahead of informed trades, then they will cause that information to
become incorporated into prices more quickly (Holden and Subrahmanyam 1992). However,
in doing so, HFTs capture some of the informed traders’ trading profits and, consequently,
decrease their incentive to become informed. Thus, a benefit due to an increase in the speed
at which information is reflected in prices would be reduced by the fact it decreases investors’
incentives to acquire new information. Alternately, if HFTs anticipate and trade ahead of
liquidity trades, as in Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005), then in these instances they will
increase price impact and, consequently, increase traditional asset managers’ transaction
costs.
On net, it is probable HFTs have a positive impact on market quality. The emer-
gence of HFTs has coincided with a substantial decrease in quoted and realized spreads
on exchanges (Castura, Litzenberger, Gorelick, and Dwivedi 2010). They make markets in
numerous financial securities and drove floor traders out of business by quoting narrower
bid-ask spreads. But the results of this study suggest that in the process of predicting future
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returns, HFTs at times acquire information about other investors’ future order flow, and in
these instances likely increase those investors’ trading costs.
This study suggests multiple areas for further research. While the results suggest
HFTs forecast non-HFT order flow, it is still unclear what information may be used to predict
order flow. One possibility is order flow predictability is driven by cross-correlations caused
by delayed reaction to common information. It is also possible a more sophisticated analysis
of the order book could reveal information useful for predicting order flow. Additionally,
this paper demonstrates that some HFTs’ trades have a stronger tendency to predict future
order flow. This may indicate that the HFTs whose trades are most strongly correlated with
future non-HFT order flow are more skilled. One way to test this would be to see if trades
from the HFTs among those whose trades are most strongly correlated with future order flow
forecast larger returns than do trades from other HFTs. It would also be worthwhile knowing
whether HFTs are predominately anticipating buying and selling pressure driven by liquidity
shocks or by information about fundamentals. This can be determined by looking at whether
initial price changes following aggressive buying and selling by HFTs eventually reverse. The
evidence in this study is consistent with HFTs anticipating informed trades in small and mid-
cap stocks, but the topic warrants further research. Another area to explore is the effect
of changing the way time is measured. All current tests use clock time, but since prices
and orders change much more quickly in active stocks than in inactive stocks, it is possible
marking off time by a set number of trades, known as trade time, is a more useful notion
of time. Research into these questions would contribute both to a better understanding of
the results in this study and of the characteristics of high-frequency returns and liquidity in
general.
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Figure 1.1: Cumulative HFT vs. non-HFT Net Marketable Buying.
This figure plots cumulative standardized net marketable buying for stocks sorted into portfolios by HFTs’
net marketable buying. Panel A uses all intra-day periods. Panel B excludes stocks that have a news article
about them published within five minutes of the sort period. Table 1.3 describes the news data. The left
y-axis is for HFT net marketable buying in the same direction as their net buying, HFTNMBSD, and the
right y-axis is for non-HFT net marketable buying, non-HFTNMB . Table 1.2 describes construction of
these imbalance measures. Stocks are sorted into deciles based on HFT net marketable buying using decile
breakpoints from the prior trading day. Stocks in decile ten and for which HFTNMBSD is greater than zero
are marked as those HFTs bought. Stocks in decile one and for which HFTNMBSD is less than zero are
marked as those HFTs sold. The reason for conditioning on HFTNMBSD rather than just HFTNMB is that
it ensures variation is driven by times when HFTs are either on net buying and buying aggressively or on
net selling and selling aggressively.
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This figure plots returns for stocks sorted into portfolios by HFTs’ net marketable buying. Panel A uses all
intra-day periods. Panel B excludes stocks that have a news article about them published within five minutes
of the sort period. Table 1.3 describes the news data. Stocks are sorted into deciles based on HFT net
marketable buying. Decile breakpoints are calculated from non-zero observations during the prior trading
day. Stocks in decile ten and for which HFTNMBSD is greater than zero are marked as those HFTs bought.
Stocks in decile one and for which HFTNMBSD is less than zero are marked as those HFTs sold. The
reason for conditioning on HFTNMBSD rather than just HFTNMB is that it ensures variation is driven by
times when HFTs are either on net buying and buying aggressively or on net selling and selling aggressively.
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Figure 1.3: Post-sort Returns By Size Portfolios.
The y-axis scale is returns in basis points. Stocks are sorted into deciles based on HFT net marketable
buying. Decile breakpoints are calculated from non-zero observations during the prior trading day. Stocks
in decile ten and for which HFTNMBSD is greater than zero are marked as those HFTs bought. Stocks
in decile one and for which HFTNMBSD is less than zero are marked as those HFTs sold. The reason for
conditioning on HFTNMBSD rather than just HFTNMB is that it ensures variation is driven by times when
HFTs are either on net buying and buying aggressively or on net selling and selling aggressively. Table 1.2
describes construction of these imbalance measures.
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Figure 1.4: Response of non-HFT Net Marketable Buying to a One Standard
Deviation Shock to HFT Net Marketable Buying
This figure plots the impulse response function describing the response of non-HFT net marketable buying,
non-HFTNMB , to a one standard deviation shock to HFT net marketable buying in the same direction
as net buying, HFTNMBSD. Table 1.2 describes construction of these imbalance measures. The response
is expressed in standard deviations. The results are based on the vector autoregression (VAR) in Ta-
ble 1.6. Stock-day observations are excluded if any of the variables fail an augmented Dickey-Fuller test
for stationarity. The impulse response function is orthogonalized to allow for contemporaneous effects. The
ordering of the variables is such that HFTNMBSD has a contemporaneous effect on non-HFTNMB and
returns. non-HFTNMB has a contemporaneous effect on returns but does not contemporaneously affect
HFTNMBSD. Returns are assumed to have no contemporaneous effect on either trading measure. Impulse
response functions are estimated by stock each day, and then the daily cross-sectional mean is calculated.
The solid line is the mean of the daily time series, and the dotted lines indicate 95% confidence intervals
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Figure 1.5: HFT Net Buying and Returns 60 minutes before and after intense
HFT Net Marketable Buying
The figure examines HFT net buying from 60 minutes before to 60 minutes after periods of intense HFT net
marketable buying or selling. HFTNB is cumulative standardized HFT net buying. Buy and hold returns are
market adjusted using contemporaneous returns on SPY. Stocks are sorted into deciles based on HFT net
marketable buying. Decile breakpoints are calculated from non-zero observations during the prior trading
day. Stocks in decile ten and for which HFTNMBSD is greater than zero are marked as those HFTs bought.
Stocks in decile one and for which HFTNMBSD is less than zero are marked as those HFTs sold. The reason
for conditioning on HFTNMBSD rather than just HFTNMB is that it ensures variation is driven by times
when HFTs are either on net buying and buying aggressively or on net selling and selling aggressively. To
handle clustering of observations, observations are first averaged by stock-day, then by day, and then finally
across the complete time-series. Observations must have data from 60 minutes before to 60 minutes after
the sort period, so the figure excludes the first and last hour of the trading day.
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Figure 1.6: Transition Probabilities
This figure plots the probability an HFT who is in the group of HFTs whose trades are most strongly
correlated with future non-HFT order flow in month 0 will be in that group in later months. The percents
are calculated for each sort month and then averaged across all sort months in the sample. HFTs that leave
the sample after the sort period are assigned to the lowest correlation group. The four lines indicate different
sorting methods discussed in Table 1.12. The dotted line at 33.3% is what would be expected in months 1–3
if there were no persistence in which HFTs’ trades are most strongly correlated with future non-HFT trades.
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Table 1.1: Summary of Stock Characteristics
This table summarises stock characteristics. The characteristics are calculated from the pooled time-series
of all stock-day observations. Size portfolio breakpoints are computed among NYSE-listed stocks. Size
portfolios for year t are formed on December 31st of year t − 1. Deciles one through five are small-cap, six
through eight are mid-cap, and nine through ten are large-cap. MV is market value, PRC is the closing
price, VOL is daily share volume, DOLVOL is daily dollar volume, RET is the daily total return, NQ is the
share of total dollar volume that traded on NASDAQ, HFT is the fraction of NASDAQ dollar volume traded
by HFTs, and N is stocks per day.
MV PRC VOL DOLVOL RET NQ HFT N
Mil $ $ Mil Shr. Mil $ % % %
All
mean 5301.9 26.38 2.413 58.138 0.16 27.2 27.6 93.2
sd 12908.9 19.96 5.419 111.438 3.69 13.5 13.7 1.6
0% 22.1 0.91 0.007 0.075 −69.96 0.7 0.0 89.0
25% 402.4 13.58 0.165 2.728 −1.51 15.6 16.1 93.0
50% 1301.4 22.05 0.601 12.627 0.06 25.0 27.7 93.0
75% 4027.3 33.73 2.389 69.827 1.75 38.1 37.9 94.0
100% 125330.6 166.82 113.013 2153.084 40.92 80.7 78.4 96.0
Small-cap
mean 366.7 16.52 0.296 4.000 0.15 26.3 16.7 33.4
sd 269.2 9.93 0.694 7.815 4.51 15.1 9.6 1.3
0% 22.1 0.91 0.007 0.075 −69.96 0.8 0.0 30.0
25% 188.9 9.29 0.074 1.025 −1.99 13.3 9.4 33.0
50% 293.4 14.77 0.144 1.894 0.00 22.5 14.8 33.0
75% 448.5 20.51 0.277 3.869 2.20 38.3 22.4 34.0
100% 1920.8 71.69 21.938 363.294 40.92 78.8 78.4 36.0
Mid-cap
mean 1900.1 26.10 2.288 34.188 0.17 27.1 28.9 35.8
sd 1191.5 13.76 5.278 50.672 3.52 12.6 11.1 0.4
0% 238.3 1.02 0.009 0.234 −30.59 0.7 0.0 35.0
25% 1011.5 14.50 0.303 7.538 −1.45 16.3 21.3 36.0
50% 1565.5 25.04 0.741 15.524 0.08 26.0 29.2 36.0
75% 2461.7 35.65 1.869 40.599 1.71 36.7 36.6 36.0
100% 8932.0 77.22 110.098 1270.319 34.40 80.7 71.2 36.0
Large-cap
mean 17252.2 40.55 5.551 169.288 0.15 28.5 40.7 24.0
sd 21241.6 28.16 7.467 164.436 2.46 12.2 9.0 0.0
0% 2344.1 6.79 0.143 7.258 −13.36 3.1 8.1 24.0
25% 6043.6 22.78 1.829 70.931 −1.12 17.3 34.3 24.0
50% 9413.5 31.37 3.557 120.235 0.08 26.9 40.9 24.0
75% 18532.6 49.58 6.140 203.584 1.37 39.4 47.2 24.0
100% 125330.6 166.82 113.013 2153.084 23.26 62.8 66.9 24.0
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Table 1.2: Summary of Stock-Day Observations
This table provides summary statistics describing returns and net buying measures for the sample stocks.
Each day, for every stock, the standard deviation of NBBO bid-ask midpoint returns (ret), HFTs’ net buying
(HFTNB), HFTs’ net marketable buying (HFTNMB), HFTs’ net marketable buying when it is the same
direction as their net buying (HFTNMBSD), and non-HFTs’ net marketable buying (non-HFTNMB) are
calculated. Net buying is shares bought minus shares sold. Net marketable buying is shares bought in
buyer-initiated trades minus shares sold in seller-initiated trades. To make net-buying measures comparable
across stocks, they are divided by 20-day trailing average daily volume. For HFTNMBSD, I require that
HFT net buying is in the same direction as net marketable buying. Specifically, positive values of HFT net
marketable buying are set to zero if net buying is less than the fourth quintile, and negative values are set to
zero if net buying is greater than the second quintile. For this table only, imbalance measures are expressed
in shares rather than as a fraction of trailing volume to ease interpretation. Rows describe the distribution
of that stock-level statistic across all stock days.
σ(ret) σ(HFTNB) σ(HFTNMB) σ(HFTNMBSD) σ(non-HFTNMB)
% shares shares shares shares
All Stocks
mean 0.08 83 80 76 125
sd 0.15 177 157 147 294
0% 0.00 0 0 0 0
25% 0.02 10 8 8 18
50% 0.03 28 26 26 42
75% 0.07 86 86 83 115
100% 2.70 3387 2351 2235 5681
Small-cap
mean 0.05 13 11 11 27
sd 0.07 19 17 16 39
0% 0.00 0 0 0 0
25% 0.02 5 4 3 10
50% 0.03 9 7 7 18
75% 0.05 16 13 13 30
100% 0.88 553 543 537 1001
Mid-cap
mean 0.09 89 81 78 138
sd 0.17 193 155 145 325
0% 0.00 0 0 0 1
25% 0.01 17 16 15 25
50% 0.02 35 34 33 49
75% 0.08 74 71 69 110
100% 2.29 3387 2351 2235 5681
Large-cap
mean 0.11 175 178 169 247
sd 0.21 228 211 196 391
0% 0.00 13 13 12 12
25% 0.01 67 69 66 81
50% 0.02 116 123 118 138
75% 0.13 185 199 188 247
100% 2.70 2511 1915 1769 4909
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Table 1.3: Summary of News Data
This table summarizes news data. News for a stock comes from the Factiva news archive. Panel A
shows the distribution among sample stocks in the total number of articles and number of trading days
with news. The left two columns in Panel B show the top 10 sources for time-stamped news, and the
right three columns shows the number of stamped vs. all articles from three major business news publications.
Panel A: Distribution of Articles
Per Stock Time-stamped Articles All Articles
Articles Days with Articles Articles Days with Articles
mean 70 29 762 130
sd 147 33 1611 78
0% 1 1 14 12
25% 12 8 128 60
50% 22 16 227 105
75% 83 40 884 207
100% 1106 158 11877 251
Panel B: Source Summary
Top Time-stamped News Sources Stamp/No-stamp Breakdown for Major Sources
Articles Stamped All
Dow Jones News Service 871 Dow Jones 4413 6597
Associated Press Newswires 751 Reuters 1317 3234
MidnightTrader 604 Wall Street Journal 174 1556
PR Newswire (U.S.) 488
Reuters News 365
Regulatory News Service 341
Business Wire 337
MarketWatch 259
Market News Publishing 234
DJ em Portugu??s 219
49
Table 1.4: Non-HFT Net Marketable Buying for Stocks Sorted by HFT Net
Marketable Buying
This table shows investment fund net marketable buying for stocks sorted on HFTs’ net marketable buying
at the one-second horizon. Panel B excludes stocks that have a news article about them published within
five minutes of the sort period. Table 1.3 describes the news data. Net marketable buying is shares bought
in buyer-initiated trades minus shares sold in seller-initiated trades. Stocks are sorted into deciles at time t
based on HFT net-marketable buying. Decile breakpoints are calculated from non-zero observations during
the prior trading day. To make net-buying measures comparable across stocks, they are divided by 20-day
trailing average daily volume. I require that HFT net buying is in the same direction as net marketable
buying. Specifically, portfolios one and two require net buying to be in net buying quintiles one or two,
and portfolios nine and ten require net buying to be in quintiles four or five. Net buying is shares bought
minus shares sold. Size portfolio breakpoints are computed among NYSE-listed stocks. Size portfolios for
year t are formed on December 31st of year t− 1. Deciles one through five are small-cap, six through eight
are mid-cap, and nine through ten are large-cap. Non-HFTs’ net marketable buying is averaged across all
observations for a day, and the mean of the daily time series is reported in the table. Parentheses indicate
Newey and West (1994) t-statistics for the time-series means.
Panel A: All intra-day periods
Decile Seconds
[t− 30, t− 1] t− 1 t t+ 1 [t+ 1, t+ 30] [t+ 1, t+ 300]
All Stocks
10 (HFT Buying) 0.30 0.10 0.46 0.09 0.66 1.22
(5.88) (22.55) (24.57) (25.35) (15.67) (3.06)
9 0.18 0.04 0.10 0.03 0.26 0.50
(15.41) (29.68) (23.66) (20.16) (21.74) (7.26)
2 − 0.16 − 0.05 − 0.11 − 0.03 − 0.26 − 0.60
(−16.10) (−26.13) (−24.40) (−28.10) (−25.95) (−8.47)
1 (HFT Selling) − 0.33 − 0.11 − 0.45 − 0.09 − 0.68 − 1.76
(−6.02) (−22.36) (−37.69) (−19.93) (−11.59) (−4.84)
Small-cap
10 (HFT Buying) 1.11 0.25 0.96 0.21 1.41 2.55
(5.70) (17.69) (18.11) (14.46) (9.62) (1.75)
1 (HFT Selling) − 1.12 − 0.26 − 0.95 − 0.18 − 1.28 − 3.22
(−5.14) (−11.73) (−26.07) (−9.83) (−5.69) (−2.46)
Mid-cap
10 (HFT Buying) 0.28 0.11 0.47 0.09 0.62 1.22
(6.07) (19.12) (27.28) (22.99) (16.37) (4.81)
1 (HFT Selling) − 0.36 − 0.11 − 0.48 − 0.09 − 0.68 − 1.73
(−7.49) (−21.32) (−29.30) (−21.44) (−14.33) (−6.21)
Large-cap
10 (HFT Buying) − 0.00 0.03 0.23 0.05 0.39 0.86
(−0.00) (9.75) (27.92) (20.49) (18.17) (6.78)
1 (HFT Selling) 0.03 − 0.03 − 0.23 − 0.05 − 0.38 − 0.92
(1.56) (−15.65) (−30.10) (−17.55) (−23.70) (−8.22)50
Table 1.4—continued
Panel B: Periods that are not within +/− 5 minutes of a news article
Decile Seconds
[t− 30, t− 1] t− 1 t t+ 1 [t+ 1, t+ 30] [t+ 1, t+ 300]
10 (HFT Buying) 0.29 0.10 0.45 0.09 0.65 1.26
(6.45) (22.46) (24.69) (27.70) (16.80) (3.99)
9 0.18 0.04 0.10 0.03 0.26 0.51
(15.41) (29.79) (23.86) (20.10) (21.71) (7.23)
2 − 0.16 − 0.05 − 0.11 − 0.03 − 0.26 − 0.61
(−15.56) (−25.85) (−24.57) (−28.26) (−25.22) (−8.82)
1 (HFT Selling) − 0.32 − 0.10 − 0.45 − 0.09 − 0.66 − 1.68
(−7.36) (−26.62) (−38.42) (−22.62) (−15.62) (−6.03)
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Table 1.5: Returns for Stocks Sorted by HFT Net Marketable Buying
This table shows returns in basis points for stocks sorted on HFTs’ net marketable buying at the one-second
horizon. Panel B excludes stocks that have a news article about them published within five minutes of
the sort period. Table 1.3 describes the news data. Stocks are sorted into deciles at time t based on
HFT net-marketable buying. Decile breakpoints are calculated from non-zero observations during the
prior trading day. To make net-buying measures comparable across stocks, they are divided by 20-day
trailing average daily volume. I require that HFT net buying is in the same direction as net marketable
buying. Specifically, portfolios one and two require net buying to be in net buying quintiles one or two, and
portfolios nine and ten require net buying to be in quintiles four or five. Net marketable buying is shares
bought in buyer-initiated trades minus shares sold in seller-initiated trades. Net buying is shares bought
minus shares sold. Size portfolio breakpoints are computed among NYSE-listed stocks. Size portfolios for
year t are formed on December 31st of year t− 1. Deciles one through five are small-cap, six through eight
are mid-cap, and nine through ten are large-cap. Returns are averaged across all observations for a day,
and the mean of the daily time series is reported in the table. Parentheses indicate Newey and West (1994)
t-statistics for the time-series means.
Panel A: All intra-day periods
Decile Seconds
[t− 30, t− 1] t− 1 t t+ 1 [t+ 1, t+ 30] [t+ 1, t+ 300]
All Stocks
10 (HFT Buying) 4.56 4.47 0.92 0.55 1.23 0.62
(27.90) (27.29) (15.33) (16.91) (12.40) (1.41)
9 3.47 3.11 0.66 0.48 0.68 0.51
(29.18) (24.50) (9.77) (15.48) (11.16) (3.26)
2 − 3.28 − 3.02 − 0.51 − 0.33 − 0.49 0.14
(−30.27) (−27.70) (−9.32) (−10.32) (−6.66) (0.84)
1 (HFT Selling) − 4.40 − 4.45 − 0.80 − 0.48 − 1.04 − 0.41
(−28.10) (−28.22) (−14.16) (−14.41) (−13.63) (−1.24)
Small-cap
10 (HFT Buying) 8.20 6.56 1.32 0.60 2.54 1.32
(19.43) (20.18) (13.09) (10.58) (8.39) (0.85)
1 (HFT Selling) − 7.77 − 6.52 − 1.21 − 0.58 − 2.59 − 2.71
(−15.39) (−21.55) (−15.14) (−12.22) (−14.84) (−2.57)
Mid-cap
10 (HFT Buying) 4.63 4.56 1.02 0.61 1.52 1.17
(26.23) (27.00) (13.87) (12.23) (15.90) (4.31)
1 (HFT Selling) − 4.54 − 4.65 − 0.79 − 0.53 − 1.28 − 0.34
(−31.22) (−31.24) (−12.21) (−9.90) (−13.39) (−1.41)
Large-cap
10 (HFT Buying) 3.01 3.49 0.65 0.47 0.41 0.08
(35.83) (30.13) (12.71) (10.92) (5.14) (0.49)
1 (HFT Selling) − 2.83 − 3.39 − 0.64 − 0.38 − 0.14 0.67
(−27.62) (−30.88) (−10.21) (−7.40) (−2.07) (4.34)
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Table 1.5—continued
Panel B: Periods that are not within +/− 5 minutes of a news article
Decile Seconds
[t− 30, t− 1] t− 1 t t+ 1 [t+ 1, t+ 30] [t+ 1, t+ 300]
10 (HFT Buying) 4.54 4.47 0.92 0.55 1.23 0.65
(28.45) (27.25) (15.48) (16.75) (12.02) (1.51)
9 3.46 3.11 0.66 0.49 0.68 0.50
(29.20) (24.48) (9.73) (15.76) (11.46) (3.17)
2 − 3.29 − 3.02 − 0.51 − 0.33 − 0.49 0.13
(−29.96) (−27.56) (−9.13) (−10.53) (−6.77) (0.75)
1 (HFT Selling) − 4.39 − 4.45 − 0.80 − 0.48 − 1.04 − 0.41
(−28.53) (−28.37) (−14.31) (−14.19) (−13.04) (−1.21)
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Table 1.6: Intra-day VAR Estimates for Individual Stock-day Observations
For each stock-day observation, the following vector autoregressions (VARs) with ten lages are estimated:









λRt−i + εt,R (1.1)









λRt−i + εt,HFT (1.2)









λRt−i + εt,non-HFT (1.3)
where Rt is the one-second return, HFTNMBSD,t is one-second HFT net marketable buying in the same
direction as net buying, and non-HFTNMB,t is one-second non-HFT net marketable buying. Table 1.2
describes construction of these imbalance measures. Panel A reports the average coefficients and percent of
stock days with positive and negative coefficients that are significantly different from zero at the five percent
confidence level. In Panel B, coefficients are averaged across all observations for a day, and the mean of the
daily time series is reported in the table. Parentheses indicate Newey and West (1994) t-statistics for the
time-series means. I require at least two non-zero observation for each variable. This limits the sample
to 23,072 stock-day observations. When constructing cross-sectional means, stock-days are weighted by the
minimum number of non-zero observations among the three variables. All variables are divided by their
standard deviation among all stocks that day.
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Table 1.6—continued
Panel A: Summary of stock-day observations
lag γ (HFT) β (non-HFT) λ (R)
µ % + % - µ % + % - µ % + % -
y = non-HFTt
1 0.0023 24.9 16.6 0.0740 71.0 5.1 0.8595 90.3 0.7
2 0.0025 18.4 8.8 0.0256 49.8 7.4 −0.0171 30.2 14.0
3 0.0023 14.7 7.1 0.0188 39.7 6.3 −0.0015 18.3 10.0
4 0.0020 13.0 6.6 0.0156 34.9 6.7 −0.0025 15.3 8.1
5 0.0018 12.4 6.5 0.0146 33.6 5.8 −0.0032 12.3 8.0
6 0.0018 11.4 5.9 0.0115 28.8 6.4 0.0045 12.1 6.5
7 0.0017 10.3 6.0 0.0094 25.3 6.4 0.0017 9.9 6.9
8 0.0017 10.6 5.7 0.0088 24.1 7.1 0.0008 8.7 6.3
9 0.0016 10.3 5.3 0.0090 23.8 6.2 −0.0001 7.9 6.5
10 0.0016 10.0 5.6 0.0119 28.3 5.6 −0.0022 7.2 6.2
y = Rt
1 0.0177 40.5 3.4 0.0285 44.7 3.3 −0.1440 20.1 65.5
2 0.0109 28.1 3.4 0.0164 30.7 3.8 −0.1230 11.2 63.2
3 0.0079 21.2 4.0 0.0125 23.9 4.5 −0.1005 10.1 60.1
4 0.0064 16.8 4.6 0.0107 19.9 4.8 −0.0851 12.1 54.6
5 0.0054 13.8 4.4 0.0084 16.8 4.6 −0.0702 11.2 53.5
6 0.0038 11.8 4.5 0.0068 13.5 4.9 −0.0605 11.7 50.7
7 0.0035 9.7 4.4 0.0036 11.7 5.3 −0.0490 10.8 48.8
8 0.0019 8.5 4.6 0.0042 10.8 4.9 −0.0395 12.3 45.8
9 0.0015 8.1 4.9 0.0021 11.5 5.2 −0.0290 11.9 44.7
10 −0.0002 6.5 4.7 −0.0002 9.0 5.0 −0.0179 13.0 44.8
y = HFTt
1 0.0259 49.0 3.7 0.0053 22.9 12.5 1.6312 85.6 2.1
2 0.0090 24.9 3.9 0.0014 13.1 8.0 0.0337 27.3 7.8
3 0.0055 17.8 3.5 0.0004 9.9 7.2 0.0011 14.1 6.8
4 0.0038 14.6 4.1 −0.0005 8.7 6.9 −0.0067 10.4 6.2
5 0.0040 14.4 3.7 −0.0008 8.3 6.7 −0.0076 8.5 6.0
6 0.0025 11.0 4.5 −0.0008 7.7 6.7 −0.0076 7.2 6.2
7 0.0021 9.7 4.1 −0.0009 6.9 6.3 −0.0071 6.5 5.8
8 0.0012 8.9 4.9 −0.0005 6.9 6.2 −0.0078 5.5 5.5
9 0.0013 8.5 4.7 −0.0009 6.5 6.1 −0.0095 4.9 5.2
10 0.0005 8.7 5.3 −0.0015 6.7 6.5 −0.0081 4.6 5.3
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Table 1.6—continued
Panel B: Time-series average of mean daily coefficients
lag γ (HFT) β (non-HFT) λ (R)
µ t-stat µ t-stat µ t-stat
y = non-HFTt
1 0.0020 6.64 0.0756 38.36 0.9452 13.60
2 0.0024 18.06 0.0251 41.18 −0.0200 −4.97
3 0.0022 13.69 0.0188 40.46 −0.0020 −1.27
4 0.0019 14.09 0.0154 33.41 −0.0035 −2.23
5 0.0016 15.02 0.0145 38.71 −0.0040 −2.72
6 0.0017 15.06 0.0112 28.10 0.0047 4.61
7 0.0016 14.18 0.0094 32.96 0.0015 1.43
8 0.0016 17.22 0.0085 27.63 0.0005 0.66
9 0.0016 14.73 0.0089 31.16 −0.0006 −0.62
10 0.0015 14.00 0.0118 31.61 −0.0027 −2.69
y = Rt
1 0.0160 11.22 0.0264 15.31 −0.1438 −44.42
2 0.0098 12.58 0.0152 13.70 −0.1219 −58.42
3 0.0071 13.48 0.0114 11.54 −0.0996 −66.64
4 0.0058 9.30 0.0099 12.46 −0.0842 −62.88
5 0.0048 10.55 0.0077 11.14 −0.0697 −61.21
6 0.0034 12.20 0.0064 13.08 −0.0603 −65.25
7 0.0031 6.45 0.0034 6.43 −0.0488 −63.82
8 0.0017 8.97 0.0040 10.11 −0.0394 −66.43
9 0.0014 4.60 0.0017 3.18 −0.0290 −75.91
10 −0.0002 −1.09 −0.0003 −0.56 −0.0180 −59.27
y = HFTt
1 0.0247 31.88 0.0048 5.24 1.8031 10.52
2 0.0088 25.87 0.0016 3.45 0.0382 6.18
3 0.0056 23.70 0.0007 1.68 0.0022 0.87
4 0.0039 19.36 −0.0003 −1.14 −0.0068 −3.74
5 0.0042 16.35 −0.0009 −2.52 −0.0077 −4.68
6 0.0025 11.99 −0.0008 −2.41 −0.0074 −4.54
7 0.0021 11.43 −0.0009 −2.79 −0.0073 −5.23
8 0.0014 6.77 −0.0006 −2.11 −0.0081 −6.38
9 0.0014 8.14 −0.0010 −2.84 −0.0103 −7.04
10 0.0006 3.34 −0.0016 −4.73 −0.0086 −6.18
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Table 1.7: VAR Estimates on Days with and without News
This table reports coefficients on HFTs’ net marketable buying from the VAR in Table 1.6 conditional on
whether there is news for the stock on a given day. The table includes results for lags one through ten as well
as for the sum of those ten lags. In Panel A, a news day is the day an article about the stock appears in the
Faciva news archive. In Panel B, a news day is any day when the absolute value of market-adjusted returns
is greater than 1%. Every day, the average coefficient is calculated for each lag of HFTs’ net marketable
buying in the VAR. Each panel reports the time-series mean and median of daily cross-sectional means, For
t-tests, the null hypothesis is that the mean of the daily time series equals zero. The difference column
group also reports the p-value from a Wilcoxan rank sum test that the time-series medians are equal.
Panel A: News day defined as a day with a Factiva article
lag News days Non-news days Difference
mean t-stat median mean t-stat median mean t-stat rank sum
p-value
1 0.0019 8.39 0.0019 0.0027 7.06 0.0026 -0.0008 -1.79 0.06
2 0.0025 16.03 0.0023 0.0022 8.29 0.0019 0.0003 0.97 0.06
3 0.0022 13.31 0.0020 0.0021 10.85 0.0018 0.0002 0.76 0.21
4 0.0019 15.18 0.0018 0.0017 8.68 0.0014 0.0002 0.91 0.02
5 0.0017 13.60 0.0017 0.0016 6.18 0.0013 0.0001 0.48 0.06
6 0.0018 13.88 0.0017 0.0012 5.53 0.0011 0.0006 2.33 0.01
7 0.0016 12.73 0.0014 0.0016 6.93 0.0011 0.0000 0.05 0.05
8 0.0018 14.34 0.0016 0.0014 7.16 0.0009 0.0004 1.82 0.00
9 0.0016 12.26 0.0014 0.0016 8.73 0.0014 0.0000 0.08 0.46
10 0.0016 11.46 0.0013 0.0014 8.44 0.0009 0.0002 0.74 0.00
Σ 1-10 0.0187 29.39 0.0178 0.0174 17.95 0.0156 0.0013 1.08 0.04
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Table 1.7—continued
Panel B: News day defined as a day with |return| > 1%
lag |return| > 1% |return| ≤ 1% Difference
mean t-stat median mean t-stat median mean t-stat rank sum
p-value
1 0.0026 10.01 0.0024 0.0013 4.74 0.0011 0.0014 3.60 0.00
2 0.0026 14.96 0.0024 0.0022 11.74 0.0019 0.0004 1.51 0.03
3 0.0023 11.61 0.0021 0.0020 12.52 0.0019 0.0003 1.02 0.10
4 0.0020 13.28 0.0020 0.0017 11.06 0.0016 0.0003 1.19 0.02
5 0.0015 10.52 0.0016 0.0018 10.75 0.0015 -0.0003 -1.25 0.81
6 0.0016 10.48 0.0015 0.0019 11.05 0.0016 -0.0003 -1.29 0.67
7 0.0016 10.63 0.0013 0.0015 10.82 0.0014 0.0001 0.25 0.59
8 0.0018 13.29 0.0016 0.0015 9.81 0.0013 0.0003 1.55 0.04
9 0.0014 10.90 0.0013 0.0018 11.44 0.0015 -0.0003 -1.69 0.11
10 0.0015 10.23 0.0014 0.0017 10.52 0.0013 -0.0002 -0.96 0.84
Σ 1-10 0.0188 27.52 0.0180 0.0173 22.63 0.0155 0.0015 1.45 0.03
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Table 1.8: Predicting Order Flow with Returns and Quotes
This table examines the extent to which non-HFT order flow can be predicted using past quotes and returns.







where non-HFT is non-HFT net marketable buying, Xj is some variable, i indexes stocks, t indexes
seconds. These regressions are calculated each day using the pooled cross-section of all observations that
day. The table reports the time-series average of daily coefficients and adjusted R2 as well as Newey and
West (1994) t-statistics from tests of the hypothesis that the time-series mean of the daily coefficients equals
zero. Qt is the bid-ask quote imbalance, BidSize−AskSizeBidSize+AskSize , calculated using the national best bid and best
offer (NBBO). R is the bid-ask midpoint return. HFT is HFT net marketable buying in the same direction
as net buying.
Panel A: Regressions with one independent variable
lag (1) (2) (3) (4)
Qt R HFT non-HFT
1 −0.0136 0.0223 0.0118 0.0601
(−14.66) (16.96) (14.72) (21.98)
2 0.0019 0.0088 0.0055 0.0258
(3.51) (17.68) (10.07) (17.38)
3 0.0003 0.0056 0.0049 0.0181
(0.68) (19.23) (14.03) (13.11)
4 0.0013 0.0035 0.0034 0.0155
(3.01) (18.18) (8.48) (21.52)
Adj. R2 0.0000 0.0006 0.0006 0.0080
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Panel B: Regressions with two independent variables
lag (5) (6) (7)
HFT R non-HFT R HFT non-HFT
1 0.0115 0.0221 0.0599 0.0214 0.0079 0.0595
(14.40) (16.93) (21.90) (16.87) (11.12) (21.74)
2 0.0053 0.0084 0.0256 0.0068 0.0032 0.0254
(9.74) (17.65) (17.25) (16.76) (6.16) (17.22)
3 0.0048 0.0053 0.0180 0.0041 0.0032 0.0178
(13.67) (18.51) (13.03) (18.18) (10.43) (12.91)
4 0.0034 0.0033 0.0155 0.0025 0.0019 0.0153
(8.39) (18.18) (21.44) (16.78) (5.13) (21.18)
Adj. R2 0.0011 0.0085 0.0084
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Table 1.8—continued
Panel C: Regression with three independent variables
lag (8)
HFT non-HFT R
1 0.0077 0.0593 0.0212
(10.82) (21.66) (16.85)
2 0.0030 0.0253 0.0065
(5.91) (17.11) (16.81)
3 0.0031 0.0177 0.0039
(10.18) (12.84) (18.32)




Table 1.9: VAR Estimates at Different Times of the Day
This table reports coefficients on HFTs’ net marketable buying from the VAR in Table 1.6 conditional on
the time of day. The table includes results for lags one through ten as well as for the sum of those ten lags.
Panel A compares estimates from the open (9:30 a.m. to 10:30 a.m.) to the middle of the day (10:30 a.m.
to 3:30 p.m.), and Panel B compares estimates from the close (3:30 p.m. to 4:00 p.m.) to the middle of
the day. Every day, the average coefficient is calculated for each lag of HFTs’ net marketable buying in
the VAR. Each panel reports the time-series mean and median of daily cross-sectional means, For t-tests,
the null hypothesis is that the mean of the daily time series equals zero. The difference column group also
reports the p-value from a Wilcoxan rank sum test that the time-series medians are equal.
Panel A: Comparing the open to the middle of the day
lag 9:30–10:00 a.m. 10:00 a.m.–3:30 p.m. Difference
mean t-stat median mean t-stat median mean t-stat rank sum
p-value
1 0.0040 9.52 0.0038 0.0012 6.28 0.0010 0.0028 6.05 0.00
2 0.0036 9.71 0.0031 0.0021 16.84 0.0019 0.0015 3.80 0.00
3 0.0025 8.35 0.0023 0.0019 18.59 0.0017 0.0006 1.79 0.07
4 0.0019 6.69 0.0017 0.0017 17.24 0.0015 0.0002 0.73 0.84
5 0.0017 6.92 0.0013 0.0015 17.18 0.0014 0.0002 0.94 0.95
6 0.0021 7.91 0.0015 0.0013 16.50 0.0013 0.0008 2.97 0.02
7 0.0018 7.37 0.0015 0.0013 14.73 0.0010 0.0005 2.03 0.21
8 0.0013 5.79 0.0013 0.0012 14.51 0.0010 0.0002 0.65 0.52
9 0.0016 5.84 0.0015 0.0012 15.15 0.0011 0.0004 1.52 0.50
10 0.0019 7.88 0.0015 0.0015 16.59 0.0012 0.0004 1.64 0.49
Σ 1-10 0.0224 21.14 0.0189 0.0147 25.99 0.0132 0.0077 6.39 0.00
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Table 1.9—continued
Panel B: Comparing the close to the middle of the day
lag 3:30–4:00 p.m. 10:00 a.m.–3:30 p.m. Difference
mean t-stat median mean t-stat median mean t-stat rank sum
p-value
1 -0.0029 -6.88 -0.0030 0.0012 6.28 0.0010 -0.0041 -8.87 0.00
2 0.0009 2.88 0.0005 0.0021 16.84 0.0019 -0.0012 -3.43 0.00
3 0.0012 3.37 0.0009 0.0019 18.59 0.0017 -0.0007 -2.08 0.00
4 0.0015 5.36 0.0015 0.0017 17.24 0.0015 -0.0002 -0.57 0.19
5 0.0011 4.15 0.0010 0.0015 17.18 0.0014 -0.0003 -1.13 0.05
6 0.0016 5.30 0.0015 0.0013 16.50 0.0013 0.0004 1.16 0.46
7 0.0015 5.22 0.0011 0.0013 14.73 0.0010 0.0003 0.91 0.80
8 0.0018 5.97 0.0013 0.0012 14.51 0.0010 0.0007 2.08 0.52
9 0.0022 5.72 0.0012 0.0012 15.15 0.0011 0.0010 2.54 0.56
10 0.0013 5.01 0.0009 0.0015 16.59 0.0012 -0.0001 -0.39 0.23
Σ 1-10 0.0103 8.00 0.0076 0.0147 25.99 0.0132 -0.0044 -3.13 0.00
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Table 1.10: VAR Estimates on High Volume and High Imbalance Days
This table reports coefficients on HFTs’ net marketable buying from the VAR in Table 1.6 conditional on
the stock’s volume or absolute value of net marketable buying imbalance level. The table includes results
for lags one through ten as well as for the sum of those ten lags. Panel A compares days with high volume
to normal days, and Panel B compares days with high imbalances to normal days. High volume and high
imbalance days are calculated using a methodology similar to that of Gervais, Kaniel, and Mingelgrin
(2001). A day’s volume or imbalance is ranked relative to the prior nineteen days, and if the rank is
nineteen or above, the day is considered to be a high volume or high imbalance day. Every day, the average
coefficient is calculated for each lag of HFTs’ net marketable buying in the VAR. Each panel reports the
time-series mean and median of daily cross-sectional means, For t-tests, the null hypothesis is that the mean
of the daily time series equals zero. The difference column group also reports the p-value from a Wilcoxan
rank sum test that the time-series medians are equal.
Panel A: Comparing high volume to normal days
lag High Volume Days Normal Days Difference
mean t-stat median mean t-stat median mean t-stat rank sum
p-value
1 0.0049 6.64 0.0032 0.0016 7.63 0.0015 0.0033 4.27 0.00
2 0.0045 9.25 0.0038 0.0021 15.53 0.0021 0.0023 4.63 0.00
3 0.0031 7.74 0.0024 0.0020 13.71 0.0019 0.0010 2.45 0.03
4 0.0022 5.75 0.0022 0.0018 16.96 0.0016 0.0004 1.00 0.08
5 0.0022 5.18 0.0017 0.0016 15.91 0.0015 0.0005 1.22 0.43
6 0.0020 5.57 0.0018 0.0017 14.77 0.0015 0.0003 0.87 0.69
7 0.0015 3.42 0.0008 0.0015 14.33 0.0013 0.0000 0.01 0.02
8 0.0019 4.31 0.0015 0.0016 15.62 0.0015 0.0003 0.69 0.59
9 0.0020 5.44 0.0017 0.0015 13.45 0.0014 0.0005 1.23 0.46
10 0.0019 5.37 0.0013 0.0014 12.55 0.0013 0.0005 1.28 0.99
Σ 1-10 0.0261 14.74 0.0223 0.0169 30.11 0.0159 0.0092 4.94 0.00
64
Table 1.10—continued
Panel B: Comparing high imbalance to normal days
lag High Imbalance Days Normal Days Difference
mean t-stat median mean t-stat median mean t-stat rank sum
p-value
1 0.0036 5.27 0.0035 0.0018 8.75 0.0015 0.0018 2.48 0.00
2 0.0036 7.15 0.0032 0.0023 16.82 0.0021 0.0013 2.57 0.00
3 0.0026 5.34 0.0030 0.0021 14.78 0.0019 0.0005 0.99 0.01
4 0.0022 5.94 0.0019 0.0018 16.53 0.0017 0.0003 0.91 0.38
5 0.0014 2.35 0.0019 0.0017 16.59 0.0015 -0.0003 -0.51 0.37
6 0.0027 4.64 0.0019 0.0016 15.14 0.0015 0.0010 1.78 0.17
7 0.0008 0.62 0.0013 0.0015 14.85 0.0014 -0.0008 -0.61 0.54
8 0.0019 4.22 0.0013 0.0016 16.47 0.0015 0.0003 0.61 0.37
9 0.0018 3.73 0.0019 0.0015 13.19 0.0014 0.0002 0.47 0.41
10 0.0017 4.01 0.0012 0.0015 13.98 0.0013 0.0002 0.49 0.56
Σ 1-10 0.0222 9.22 0.0237 0.0175 31.01 0.0165 0.0047 1.89 0.00
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Table 1.11: VAR Estimates for Stocks with High versus Low Spreads
This table reports coefficients on HFTs’ net marketable buying from the VAR in Table 1.6 conditional
on the stock’s bid-ask spread the prior day. Daily spreads are calculated by duration-weighting intra-day
spread observations. The table includes results for lags one through ten as well as for the sum of those ten
lags. Panel A compares stocks sorted on spreads, and Panel B compares stocks sorted on relative spreads,
which is the spread divided by the bid-ask midpoint. Every day, the average coefficient is calculated for
each lag of HFTs’ net marketable buying in the VAR. Each panel reports the time-series mean and median
of daily cross-sectional means, For t-tests, the null hypothesis is that the mean of the daily time series
equals zero. The difference column group also reports the p-value from a Wilcoxan rank sum test that the
time-series medians are equal.
Panel A: Comparing high spread to low spread stocks
lag High Spread Stocks Low Spread Stocks Difference
mean t-stat median mean t-stat median mean t-stat rank sum
p-value
1 0.0053 14.60 0.0046 0.0000 0.03 0.0001 0.0053 11.18 0.00
2 0.0032 13.15 0.0026 0.0020 9.28 0.0019 0.0012 3.57 0.00
3 0.0025 10.13 0.0022 0.0020 10.46 0.0017 0.0005 1.49 0.13
4 0.0018 12.03 0.0017 0.0018 10.78 0.0014 0.0000 0.07 0.44
5 0.0018 11.16 0.0015 0.0016 10.64 0.0015 0.0002 0.70 0.81
6 0.0015 12.53 0.0015 0.0018 11.77 0.0016 -0.0002 -1.14 0.57
7 0.0016 9.73 0.0014 0.0017 11.34 0.0013 -0.0001 -0.53 0.64
8 0.0013 8.32 0.0011 0.0019 12.73 0.0016 -0.0005 -2.51 0.01
9 0.0013 8.09 0.0011 0.0018 10.32 0.0016 -0.0005 -2.17 0.01
10 0.0015 8.85 0.0013 0.0016 9.32 0.0015 -0.0001 -0.61 0.16
Σ 1-10 0.0218 25.56 0.0207 0.0162 22.09 0.0145 0.0056 4.95 0.00
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Table 1.11—continued
Panel B: Comparing high relative spread to low relative spread stocks
lag High RelSpread Stocks Low RelSpread Stocks Difference
mean t-stat median mean t-stat median mean t-stat rank sum
p-value
1 0.0046 7.81 0.0037 0.0012 4.68 0.0007 0.0034 5.22 0.00
2 0.0036 8.39 0.0030 0.0023 13.21 0.0022 0.0014 2.93 0.02
3 0.0032 8.38 0.0022 0.0020 11.78 0.0019 0.0011 2.76 0.14
4 0.0014 6.37 0.0011 0.0020 14.56 0.0018 -0.0006 -2.18 0.00
5 0.0019 6.32 0.0015 0.0016 12.61 0.0017 0.0002 0.73 0.61
6 0.0014 6.62 0.0010 0.0019 13.06 0.0018 -0.0005 -2.00 0.01
7 0.0010 3.97 0.0008 0.0016 11.94 0.0013 -0.0006 -1.98 0.00
8 0.0013 4.67 0.0009 0.0018 13.09 0.0015 -0.0005 -1.65 0.00
9 0.0012 4.55 0.0009 0.0018 12.32 0.0017 -0.0006 -2.01 0.01
10 0.0018 5.33 0.0014 0.0016 11.52 0.0014 0.0002 0.56 0.69
Σ 1-10 0.0214 17.66 0.0190 0.0179 25.03 0.0169 0.0035 2.52 0.10
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Table 1.12: Examining Cross-sectional Differences in Prediction Ability
This table tests whether some HFTs consistently predict future buying and selling pressure better than
others. The test examines whether the HFTs who predict buying and selling pressure the best one month
continue to do so the next month. Each day, the following regression is run for each HFT:









λd,i,lRd,s,t−l + εd,s,t, (1.4)
where d indexes days, s indexes stocks, t indexes seconds, and i indexes HFTs. non-HFT is non-HFT net
marketable buying, HFT is either the HFT’s net marketable buying or their net buying, and R is the stock’s
return. The individual HFTs’ net marketable buying and net buying measures are divided by the standard
deviation of aggregate HFT net marketable buying and net buying, respectively. The left two columns in the
table below report results from regressions where HFT is HFTs’ net marketable buying, and the right two
columns report results where HFT is their net buying. For regression (1.4), I require there to be more than
100 non-zero net marketable buying observations to ensure relatively precise coefficient estimates. Then
for each month, among HFTs for whom regression (1.4) could be estimated at least 15 days during the
current and following month, HFTs are split into three groups based on their γi coefficients. There are two
groupings: in the first grouping, HFTs are split based on their γd,i,1 for that month, and in the second
grouping, the split is based on their
∑10
l=1 γd,i,l. The cross-sectional average γd,i,1 or
∑10
l=1 γd,i,l coefficients
are then calculated the following month (i.e., the post-sort month). The table reports the time-series mean,
t-stat, and p-value from t-tests of the monthly time-series of cross-sectional means for the three groups. The
p-values are included, because since the number of months, and so degrees of freedom, is so small, standard
rules of thumb for determining statistical significance (e.g., |t-stat| > 1.96) do not apply. High-frequency
traders go in and out of the sample, so months are weighted by the number of HFTs in that month’s group.
HFT = Net Mkt. Buying HFT = Net Buying
µt+1 t-stat p-value µt+1 t-stat p-value
γd,i,1
High in month t 0.014 5.97 0.000 0.022 12.07 0.000
Mid in month t 0.011 7.61 0.000 0.010 3.28 0.008
Low in month t 0.002 0.64 0.538 0.005 3.59 0.005
High minus Low 0.012 3.51 0.006 0.017 8.18 0.000∑10
l=1 γd,i,l
High in month t 0.080 12.15 0.000 0.098 6.91 0.000
Mid in month t 0.034 7.00 0.000 0.033 8.67 0.000
Low in month t 0.012 1.91 0.085 0.009 2.65 0.025







Table A.1: Summary of CRSP Universe
This table summarises 2009 stock-day observations for CRSP common stocks with dual-class stocks removed.
The table summarises market capitization, mv, dollar volume, dolvol, and price, prc. Market value and dollar
volume are in millions. The column szp denotes size deciles. Size portfolio breakpoints are computed among
NYSE-listed stocks. Size portfolios for year t are formed on December 31st of year t−1. Deciles one through
five are small-cap, six through eight are mid-cap, and nine through ten are large-cap.
szp nstocks avg sd min q1 q2 q3 max
mv
1 690 18 23 0 7 12 19 436
2 753 58 56 1 30 44 64 996
3 589 139 100 4 81 114 165 1,525
4 575 305 216 13 188 262 360 5,695
5 414 576 308 24 389 509 672 3,526
6 312 977 447 31 698 883 1,126 4,194
7 275 1,677 728 101 1,193 1,538 1,981 6,643
8 212 2,871 1,092 373 2,164 2,672 3,341 10,955
9 213 5,645 2,450 523 3,926 5,208 6,876 33,010
10 202 35,668 43,505 2,375 13,512 19,839 34,675 415,274
dolvol
1 690 0.15 1.99 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 324.23
2 753 0.45 2.88 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.19 231.69
3 589 1.27 5.30 0.00 0.12 0.34 0.89 590.10
4 575 3.34 13.92 0.00 0.59 1.36 2.97 1,533.59
5 414 7.41 17.36 0.00 1.85 3.63 7.49 1,704.35
6 312 14.23 26.80 0.00 4.14 7.70 15.22 1,674.99
7 275 26.72 34.07 0.06 9.90 17.49 31.94 2,655.60
8 212 44.17 57.97 0.07 17.25 30.10 54.75 7,143.57
9 213 90.52 120.99 0.52 40.24 65.87 106.64 7,129.60
10 202 374.36 556.13 7.96 128.37 218.11 381.70 19,972.16
prc
1 690 2.13 3.24 0.01 0.54 1.24 2.63 78.00
2 753 4.99 5.10 0.01 1.65 3.51 6.71 62.00
3 589 7.87 7.92 0.05 3.10 5.96 10.06 329.79
4 575 12.59 10.99 0.10 5.74 9.71 16.33 155.72
5 414 17.14 14.09 0.06 8.32 14.09 22.36 195.98
6 312 20.60 12.78 0.26 11.30 17.94 26.66 103.86
7 275 29.12 71.06 0.25 14.26 22.42 32.79 1,549.00
8 212 38.63 58.21 0.75 17.76 26.94 39.49 731.00
9 213 32.17 22.92 0.35 18.77 27.70 39.77 306.58
10 202 45.08 43.05 1.02 24.63 37.39 52.40 622.87
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Table A.2: Sample Universe
This table summarises 2009 stock-day observations for the set of stocks from which the sample is constructed.
The stocks consist of CRSP common equities with dual-class stocks removed. Stocks are also excluded from
the sample universe if they fall in the bottom two size deciles, if their price at the end of 2008 is less than
$5, or if average daily dollar volume in December 2008 is less than $1 dollars. The table summarises market
capitization, mv, dollar volume, dolvol, and price, prc. Market value and dollar volume are in millions. The
column szp denotes size deciles. Size portfolio breakpoints are computed among NYSE-listed stocks. Size
portfolios for year t are formed on December 31st of year t − 1. Deciles one through five are small-cap, six
through eight are mid-cap, and nine through ten are large-cap.
szp nstocks avg sd min q1 q2 q3 max
mv
3 44 175 90 22 114 160 216 674
4 322 319 162 24 215 289 381 2,151
5 347 554 244 28 392 506 655 2,499
6 293 956 421 31 692 875 1,105 4,194
7 261 1,656 695 169 1,189 1,529 1,961 5,977
8 205 2,858 1,057 373 2,169 2,672 3,329 10,955
9 209 5,568 2,216 523 3,915 5,176 6,835 17,693
10 201 35,774 43,588 2,375 13,525 19,917 34,872 415,274
dolvol
3 44 1.88 3.86 0.00 0.60 1.15 2.16 229.51
4 322 3.36 7.18 0.00 1.02 1.88 3.56 888.89
5 347 6.59 13.04 0.00 1.98 3.64 7.07 1,704.35
6 293 13.31 22.07 0.00 4.11 7.51 14.46 1,283.42
7 261 25.71 31.28 0.06 9.82 17.16 30.99 2,655.60
8 205 43.30 46.58 0.07 17.20 29.88 54.12 1,969.46
9 209 85.76 84.23 0.52 39.87 65.17 105.01 2,761.70
10 201 375.33 557.28 7.96 128.60 218.68 382.83 19,972.16
prc
3 44 12.66 11.78 0.91 6.84 10.60 15.58 329.79
4 322 14.82 10.17 0.73 7.95 12.12 18.88 111.85
5 347 18.17 11.53 0.53 9.78 15.62 23.60 120.33
6 293 21.51 12.55 0.26 12.62 18.69 27.31 103.86
7 261 30.37 72.71 1.04 15.38 23.34 33.45 1,549.00
8 205 39.33 58.76 1.02 18.28 27.27 39.79 731.00
9 209 32.65 22.84 1.03 19.25 27.98 40.08 306.58
10 201 45.28 43.07 1.02 24.85 37.53 52.49 622.87
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Table A.3: Detailed Summary of Stock-Day Observations
This table provides summary statistics describing returns and net buying measures for the sample stocks.
Each day, for every stock, the average, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, and number of non-zero
observations of HFTs’ net marketable buying, HFTs’ net marketable buying where it is the same direction as
their net buying, non-HFTs’ net marketable buying, and returns are calculated. For HFTs’ net marketable
buying in the same direction as net buying, observations are set to zero if net marketable buying is negative
and net buying is above the second quintile, or if net marketable buying is positive, and net buying is below
the fourth quintile. Columns indicate the stock-level statistic, and rows describe the distribution of that
stock-level statistic across all stock-days.
avg sd min max non-zero
HFT Net Buy (shares)
mean −0.05 82.92 −3208.92 3143.25 778.79
sd 3.22 176.82 7417.72 6587.39 991.21
0% −75.25 0.00 −374962.00 0.00 0.00
25% −0.29 9.84 −3117.00 500.00 81.00
50% 0.00 28.22 −1200.00 1200.00 334.00
75% 0.22 86.07 −500.00 3100.00 1152.00
100% 97.37 3386.79 0.00 129526.00 9255.00
HFT Net Mkt. Buy (shares)
mean −0.03 79.92 −3120.39 3104.63 629.65
sd 2.35 156.69 6426.73 6395.86 829.02
0% −65.81 0.00 −152374.00 0.00 0.00
25% −0.20 8.20 −3100.00 400.00 53.00
50% 0.00 26.25 −1100.00 1100.00 266.00
75% 0.18 86.37 −400.00 3100.00 908.00
100% 71.76 2351.48 0.00 119277.00 6874.00
HFT Net Mkt. Buy Same Dir (shares)
mean −0.03 76.14 −3098.06 3086.62 373.29
sd 2.19 146.77 6382.88 6375.01 463.04
0% −52.77 0.00 −152374.00 0.00 0.00
25% −0.20 7.95 −3084.00 400.00 45.00
50% 0.00 25.52 −1100.00 1100.00 188.00
75% 0.18 82.99 −400.00 3087.00 535.00
100% 50.79 2234.93 0.00 119277.00 4802.00
non-HFT Net Mkt. Buy (shares)
mean −0.06 124.70 −5946.96 6108.01 822.36
sd 4.61 294.22 15288.41 16937.88 906.77
0% −116.22 0.00 −347535.00 0.00 0.00
25% −0.48 18.10 −5000.00 800.00 194.00
50% −0.01 41.74 −1900.00 1900.00 456.00
75% 0.44 115.43 −800.00 5100.00 1160.00
100% 89.91 5681.36 0.00 590702.00 9957.00
Ret (%)
mean 0.00 0.08 −2.09 2.20 2078.62
sd 0.00 0.15 2.47 2.72 1638.14
0% 0.00 0.00 −36.86 0.00 0.00
25% 0.00 0.02 −2.83 0.42 987.00
50% 0.00 0.03 −0.92 0.94 1639.00
75% 0.00 0.07 −0.42 2.92 2672.00
100% 0.04 2.70 0.00 71.35 13934.00
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Table A.4: Returns for Stocks Sorted by High-Frequency Trader Net Buying
This table shows returns for stocks sorted on HFTs’ net marketable buying (Panels A and B) and net
buying (Panel C). Net marketable buying is shares bought in buyer-initiated trades minus shares sold in
seller-initiated trades. Net buying is shares bought minus shares sold. Stocks are sorted into deciles at
time t based on HFT net marketable buying (Panels A and B) or net buying (Panel C). Decile breakpoints
are calculated from non-zero observations during the prior trading day. To make net-buying measures
comparable across stocks, they are divided by 20-day trailing average daily volume. In Panel B, I require
that HFT net buying is in the same direction as net marketable buying. Specifically, portfolios one and two
require net buying to be in net buying quintiles one or two, and portfolios nine and ten require net buying
to be in quintiles four or five. Sorts in each panel are performed for net-buying measures aggregated over
one second, thirty seconds, and thirty-minute horizons. Returns are shown for periods t − 3 through t + 3,
from the end of the sort period to five minutes later, [t, t + 5m], and from the end of the sort period to
thirty minutes later, [t, t + 30m]. Returns are averaged across all observations for a day, and the mean of
the daily time series is reported in the table. Parentheses indicate Newey and West (1994) t-statistics for
the time-series means.
Panel A: Sorts on HFT net marketable buying
Deciles Ret (in basis points)
t− 3 t− 2 t− 1 t t+ 1 t+ 2 t+ 3 [t, t+ 5m] [t, t+ 30m]
1 sec.
1 − 0.06 − 0.25 − 4.38 − 0.79 − 0.45 − 0.11 − 0.05 − 1.40 − 0.53
(−3.51) (−9.38) (−26.91) (−14.38) (−14.61) (−5.23) (−2.10) (−3.38) (−0.40)
2 − 0.04 − 0.20 − 3.04 − 0.50 − 0.34 − 0.01 0.03 − 0.48 0.64
(−2.02) (−9.24) (−27.29) (−8.98) (−11.23) (−0.58) (1.16) (−2.93) (0.79)
9 0.11 0.19 3.13 0.64 0.46 0.07 0.05 1.14 1.92
(4.60) (9.40) (23.79) (9.47) (14.55) (3.26) (2.01) (6.97) (2.52)
10 0.09 0.29 4.40 0.91 0.54 0.16 0.12 1.47 1.54
(5.18) (10.92) (24.57) (16.20) (18.02) (7.96) (5.28) (3.00) (1.28)
30 sec.
1 0.65 0.83 0.62 − 8.23 − 0.21 0.11 0.25 0.53 2.43
(10.22) (10.69) (7.37) (−17.74) (−3.67) (2.06) (4.42) (2.85) (2.93)
2 0.38 0.62 0.54 − 5.98 − 0.20 0.22 0.16 0.61 2.18
(6.95) (8.23) (9.38) (−18.20) (−3.74) (3.60) (3.75) (4.11) (2.84)
9 − 0.25 − 0.47 − 0.44 6.21 0.25 0.01 − 0.06 − 0.14 0.77
(−4.19) (−8.38) (−7.76) (21.13) (4.70) (0.27) (−1.16) (−0.77) (0.99)
10 − 0.50 − 0.72 − 0.54 8.55 0.33 − 0.01 − 0.05 − 0.20 0.35
(−7.54) (−10.22) (−6.76) (18.09) (6.20) (−0.20) (−1.02) (−0.92) (0.44)
30 min.
1 3.98 4.04 4.84 − 12.26 4.17 2.25 0.93 0.77 4.17
(3.72) (3.71) (3.93) (−9.67) (4.24) (2.26) (1.03) (1.34) (4.24)
2 1.23 1.75 2.74 − 9.73 2.05 1.22 0.36 0.52 2.05
(1.01) (1.69) (2.62) (−8.77) (2.32) (1.49) (0.40) (1.01) (2.32)
9 − 1.05 − 0.89 − 1.65 11.88 − 0.03 − 0.53 1.05 0.12 − 0.03
(−0.94) (−0.78) (−1.48) (10.57) (−0.03) (−0.61) (1.29) (0.26) (−0.03)
10 − 1.16 − 0.55 − 3.26 14.56 − 0.12 0.15 − 0.14 − 0.86 − 0.12
(−1.06) (−0.48) (−2.59) (10.85) (−0.14) (0.15) (−0.14) (−1.77) (−0.14)
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Table A.4 — continued
Panel B: Sorts on HFT net marketable buying requiring net buying to be in the same direction.
Deciles Ret (in basis points)
t− 3 t− 2 t− 1 t t+ 1 t+ 2 t+ 3 [t, t+ 5m] [t, t+ 30m]
1 sec.
1 − 0.07 − 0.26 − 4.36 − 0.79 − 0.47 − 0.10 − 0.05 − 1.22 − 0.23
(−3.86) (−9.32) (−27.51) (−14.16) (−14.25) (−4.24) (−2.21) (−3.61) (−0.20)
2 − 0.07 − 0.26 − 2.96 − 0.50 − 0.33 − 0.01 0.02 − 0.39 0.83
(−3.94) (−10.57) (−27.01) (−9.25) (−10.50) (−0.51) (0.78) (−2.30) (1.01)
9 0.13 0.24 3.04 0.65 0.47 0.07 0.06 1.11 1.95
(5.49) (11.74) (23.10) (9.76) (15.38) (2.71) (2.15) (6.68) (2.50)
10 0.10 0.31 4.36 0.91 0.54 0.17 0.11 1.50 1.64
(5.68) (11.29) (26.33) (15.62) (16.84) (7.81) (4.36) (3.46) (1.47)
30 sec.
1 0.68 0.83 0.57 − 8.05 − 0.16 0.11 0.28 0.64 2.60
(11.19) (9.77) (6.79) (−18.72) (−2.56) (1.93) (4.72) (3.75) (3.18)
2 0.46 0.61 0.41 − 5.60 − 0.16 0.24 0.18 0.69 2.17
(7.62) (7.68) (6.79) (−18.10) (−2.88) (3.57) (3.52) (4.39) (2.81)
9 − 0.29 − 0.50 − 0.33 5.89 0.21 − 0.02 − 0.06 − 0.19 0.81
(−4.74) (−8.49) (−5.87) (21.56) (3.76) (−0.28) (−0.97) (−1.03) (1.02)
10 − 0.53 − 0.70 − 0.48 8.38 0.30 − 0.03 − 0.05 − 0.29 0.20
(−7.78) (−9.81) (−6.04) (18.03) (5.34) (−0.61) (−0.82) (−1.43) (0.24)
30 min.
1 3.85 4.04 5.52 − 10.07 3.86 2.41 1.05 0.54 3.86
(3.65) (3.70) (4.67) (−8.28) (4.06) (2.45) (1.11) (1.19) (4.06)
2 1.45 1.93 2.76 − 6.38 1.74 1.04 0.27 0.40 1.74
(1.09) (1.98) (2.63) (−5.64) (1.87) (1.20) (0.29) (0.81) (1.87)
9 − 1.27 − 1.45 − 2.13 8.68 − 0.25 − 0.40 0.91 0.24 − 0.25
(−1.05) (−1.23) (−1.80) (7.51) (−0.29) (−0.45) (1.05) (0.50) (−0.29)
10 − 1.30 − 0.57 − 3.74 12.29 − 0.34 0.26 − 0.07 − 0.91 − 0.34
(−1.17) (−0.48) (−2.93) (9.08) (−0.36) (0.27) (−0.06) (−1.89) (−0.36)
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Table A.4 — continued
Panel C: Sorts on HFT net buying
Deciles Ret (in basis points)
t− 3 t− 2 t− 1 t t+ 1 t+ 2 t+ 3 [t, t+ 5m] [t, t+ 30m]
1 sec.
1 − 0.06 − 0.18 − 1.61 − 0.27 − 0.19 − 0.06 0.00 0.08 0.84
(−3.76) (−7.18) (−12.04) (−7.06) (−6.55) (−3.18) (0.23) (0.23) (0.71)
2 − 0.05 − 0.18 − 0.95 − 0.16 − 0.11 − 0.02 0.05 0.45 1.32
(−2.81) (−8.80) (−12.76) (−5.16) (−4.02) (−0.57) (2.78) (2.73) (1.63)
9 0.11 0.19 1.07 0.25 0.23 0.06 0.03 0.35 1.19
(5.86) (10.44) (11.83) (6.91) (6.94) (3.16) (1.69) (2.33) (1.59)
10 0.08 0.22 1.58 0.40 0.28 0.10 0.07 0.15 0.17
(5.68) (9.74) (10.20) (10.28) (12.30) (6.80) (4.23) (0.34) (0.14)
30 sec.
1 0.54 0.56 0.25 − 3.48 0.13 0.23 0.30 1.21 2.89
(11.71) (10.05) (5.21) (−10.75) (2.56) (5.00) (6.00) (7.38) (3.44)
2 0.40 0.43 0.30 − 2.61 0.08 0.21 0.21 0.81 2.18
(8.81) (7.09) (6.24) (−12.00) (1.95) (3.97) (5.51) (5.40) (2.85)
9 − 0.16 − 0.41 − 0.16 2.80 0.07 − 0.05 − 0.04 − 0.34 0.65
(−3.08) (−7.51) (−3.25) (13.75) (1.51) (−1.30) (−0.81) (−2.21) (0.85)
10 − 0.40 − 0.42 − 0.16 3.69 − 0.01 − 0.12 − 0.10 − 0.67 − 0.08
(−7.50) (−8.83) (−3.02) (10.17) (−0.18) (−2.76) (−1.92) (−3.33) (−0.10)
30 min.
1 2.99 3.36 5.73 3.48 1.33 1.43 0.58 − 0.11 1.33
(2.66) (3.19) (4.65) (2.67) (1.41) (1.68) (0.58) (−0.27) (1.41)
2 1.52 2.62 2.71 1.10 2.46 0.59 0.60 0.71 2.46
(1.20) (2.33) (2.80) (1.05) (2.94) (0.69) (0.71) (1.69) (2.94)
9 − 1.39 − 0.88 − 1.84 2.19 0.70 0.58 0.28 0.30 0.70
(−1.07) (−0.86) (−1.66) (2.10) (0.78) (0.68) (0.30) (0.61) (0.78)
10 − 0.47 0.13 − 3.61 − 2.38 0.06 0.80 0.52 − 0.16 0.06
(−0.46) (0.12) (−2.66) (−1.70) (0.06) (0.80) (0.59) (−0.31) (0.06)
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Table A.5: Robustness of VAR to Price Feed Latency
This table tests whether potentially mismatched NASDAQ trade and NBBO quote timestamps affect the
VAR results in Table 1.6 by rerunning the VAR using NASDAQ BBO midpoint returns rather than NBBO
midpoint returns. The NASDAQ trade and NASDAQ BBO timestamps are precisely aligned. Since calcu-
lating the NASDAQ BBO is computationally intensive, the VAR uses only a subset of the sample period,
January 1st to March 4th of 2009. Panel A reports results with NASDAQ BBO midpoint returns, and Panel
B reports results with NBBO midpoint returns over the same time period. In both panels, coefficients are
averaged across all observations for a day, and the mean of the daily time series is reported in the table.
Parentheses indicate Newey and West (1994) t-statistics for the time-series means. I require at least one
non-zero observation for each variable. When constructing cross-sectional means, stock-days are weighted
by the minimum number of non-zero observations among the three variables. All variables are divided by
their standard deviation among all stocks that day.
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Table A.5—continued
Panel A: NASDAQ BBO time-series average of mean daily coefficients
lag γ (HFT) β (non-HFT) λ (R)
µ t-stat µ t-stat µ t-stat
y = Rt
1 0.0209 19.01 0.0318 43.14 −0.0512 −26.73
2 0.0124 19.08 0.0181 31.32 −0.0347 −25.42
3 0.0082 20.74 0.0145 27.07 −0.0249 −27.70
4 0.0070 18.64 0.0111 20.86 −0.0204 −22.72
5 0.0047 17.86 0.0096 15.57 −0.0169 −26.68
6 0.0037 12.00 0.0067 12.68 −0.0143 −21.59
7 0.0027 12.44 0.0050 10.09 −0.0109 −24.67
8 0.0018 4.33 0.0052 13.94 −0.0088 −25.46
9 0.0015 3.38 0.0062 10.95 −0.0072 −16.68
10 −0.0002 −0.65 0.0027 7.47 −0.0070 −10.49
y = non-HFTt
1 0.0027 8.47 0.0515 26.94 0.1714 29.84
2 0.0028 13.44 0.0217 33.69 −0.0005 −0.86
3 0.0024 9.72 0.0159 40.11 −0.0001 −0.30
4 0.0023 10.07 0.0140 19.01 0.0004 1.85
5 0.0023 9.70 0.0128 31.97 −0.0002 −0.60
6 0.0021 8.97 0.0101 21.19 0.0006 1.74
7 0.0017 10.97 0.0073 27.48 0.0007 2.61
8 0.0015 10.33 0.0074 17.01 0.0006 3.24
9 0.0016 7.62 0.0075 16.62 0.0003 1.79
10 0.0018 10.64 0.0098 31.90 0.0000 0.15
y = HFTt
1 0.0288 26.61 0.0073 8.21 0.3067 34.31
2 0.0070 5.52 0.0002 0.31 0.0160 23.13
3 0.0032 5.39 0.0008 1.63 0.0051 8.45
4 0.0034 10.57 0.0003 0.66 0.0028 5.84
5 0.0023 6.30 −0.0001 −0.13 0.0015 4.06
6 0.0014 5.78 −0.0005 −1.06 0.0011 2.68
7 0.0011 4.29 −0.0008 −1.65 0.0006 2.03
8 0.0003 0.93 −0.0007 −2.01 0.0002 0.56
9 0.0001 0.47 −0.0005 −0.71 −0.0002 −0.76
10 0.0000 0.14 −0.0001 −0.22 −0.0006 −2.55
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Table A.5—continued
Panel B: NBBO time-series average of mean daily coefficients
lag γ (HFT) β (non-HFT) λ (R)
µ t-stat µ t-stat µ t-stat
y = Rt
1 0.0199 14.55 0.0283 20.68 −0.1257 −29.90
2 0.0126 12.42 0.0168 23.97 −0.1077 −39.60
3 0.0093 16.94 0.0148 11.31 −0.0881 −42.24
4 0.0073 12.52 0.0098 12.89 −0.0752 −36.22
5 0.0061 6.74 0.0084 10.40 −0.0593 −38.77
6 0.0048 6.80 0.0070 13.12 −0.0531 −47.93
7 0.0042 9.94 0.0044 3.85 −0.0420 −31.96
8 0.0021 4.62 0.0035 6.12 −0.0357 −28.71
9 0.0022 5.66 0.0028 3.72 −0.0264 −29.15
10 −0.0004 −1.18 0.0000 −0.07 −0.0179 −26.95
y = non-HFTt
1 0.0022 6.23 0.0515 27.79 0.5565 20.79
2 0.0028 13.22 0.0219 30.71 0.0021 0.97
3 0.0023 10.04 0.0160 38.98 0.0001 0.04
4 0.0022 8.40 0.0140 18.35 0.0008 0.68
5 0.0023 8.92 0.0129 31.93 −0.0001 −0.14
6 0.0022 7.19 0.0102 21.73 0.0023 1.84
7 0.0016 9.56 0.0074 27.82 0.0023 2.52
8 0.0015 9.15 0.0074 18.50 0.0025 2.48
9 0.0015 7.07 0.0075 17.00 0.0017 1.98
10 0.0018 9.20 0.0099 28.69 0.0010 1.46
y = HFTt
1 0.0301 28.11 0.0096 10.14 0.9359 31.86
2 0.0079 5.84 0.0017 2.15 0.0295 14.69
3 0.0035 6.45 0.0015 2.50 0.0061 3.58
4 0.0035 10.82 0.0006 1.46 0.0026 1.80
5 0.0024 6.81 0.0004 0.84 0.0003 0.22
6 0.0014 7.05 −0.0003 −0.64 −0.0018 −1.71
7 0.0011 4.64 −0.0006 −1.27 −0.0013 −1.60
8 0.0001 0.40 −0.0005 −1.51 −0.0023 −6.86
9 0.0001 0.24 −0.0005 −0.72 −0.0029 −2.09
10 0.0000 −0.17 0.0002 0.36 −0.0031 −3.07
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Figure A.1: HFTs’ Share of NASDAQ Dollar Volume
This figure shows HFTs’ share of dollar volume on the NASDAQ Stock Market. The calculation includes all
stocks with CRSP share code 10 or 11 trading on NASDAQ, regardless of listing venue.
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Figure A.2: Liquidity Removing Trades as a Percent of HFT Dollar Volume
This figure shows liquidity removing trades as a percent of HFTs’ dollar volume on the NASDAQ Stock
Market. Liquidity removing trades are those in which the HFT initiates the trade with a marketable order,
which is functionally equivalent to a market order. The calculation includes all stocks with CRSP share code
































Figure A.3: Market Share By Trading Venue
Market share is reported as percent of dollar volume. NASDAQ is the NASDAQ Stock Market, NYSE is
the New York Stock Market, and TRF is the FINRA Trade Reporting Facility that includes trades that do













































Figure A.4: Coefficients from VAR with 30 lags
This figure plots the mean coefficients (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals (dotted lines) from a VAR
system similar to the one in Table 1.6, with the difference being that it uses thirty lags rather than the ten
used in Table 1.6. The coefficients are only plotted for the equation where non-HFT trading is the dependent
variable. Coefficients are averaged across all observations for a day, and the mean in the figure is the average
of the daily time series. Standard errors for the time-series mean are calculated following Newey and West
(1994).
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Figure A.5: Cumulative HFT Net Buying vs. non-HFT Net Marketable Buying
This figure examines whether HFTs reverse their positions after a period of intense net marketable buying.
The left y-axis scale is cumulative standardized HFT net buying, HFTNB , and the right y-axis scale is
cumulative standardized non-HFT net marketable buying, non-HFTNMB . Stocks are sorted into deciles
based on HFT net marketable buying. Decile breakpoints are calculated from non-zero observations during
the prior trading day. Stocks in decile ten and for which HFTNMBSD is greater than zero are marked
as those HFTs bought. Stocks in decile one and for which HFTNMBSD is less than zero are marked as
those HFTs sold. The reason for conditioning on HFTNMBSD rather than just HFTNMB is that it ensures
variation is driven by times when HFTs are either on net buying and buying aggressively or on net selling
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Panel C:  Large−cap Stocks
Stocks HFTs Buy
Stocks HFTs Sell
Figure A.6: HFT Net Buying and Returns 60 minutes before and after intense
HFT Net Marketable Buying By Size Portfolio
The figure examines HFT net buying from 60 minutes before to 60 minutes after periods of
intense HFT net marketable buying or selling. HFTNB is cumulative standardized HFT net
buying. Buy and hold returns are market adjusted using contemporaneous returns on SPY.
Stocks are sorted into deciles based on HFT net marketable buying. Decile breakpoints are
calculated from non-zero observations during the prior trading day. Stocks in decile ten
and for which HFTNMBSD is greater than zero are marked as those HFTs bought. Stocks
in decile one and for which HFTNMBSD is less than zero are marked as those HFTs sold.
The reason for conditioning on HFTNMBSD rather than just HFTNMB is that it ensures
variation is driven by times when HFTs are either on net buying and buying aggressively or
on net selling and selling aggressively. To handle clustering of observations, observations are
first averaged by stock-day, then by day, and then finally across the complete time-series.
Observations must have data from 60 minutes before to 60 minutes after the sort period, so
the figure excludes the first and last hour of the trading day.
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Figure A.7: Response of non-HFT Net Marketable Buying to a One Standard
Deviation Shock to HFT Net Marketable Buying: Different Times of the Day
This figure plots the impulse response function describing the response of non-HFT net marketable buying,
non-HFTNMB , to a one standard deviation shock to HFT net marketable buying in the same direction as
net buying, HFTNMBSD. Table 1.2 describes construction of these imbalance measures. The response is
expressed in standard deviations. The results are based on the vector autoregression (VAR) in Table 1.6.
The VARs are estimated using 10 lags. Stock-day observations are excluded if any of the variables fail an
augmented Dickey-Fuller test for stationarity. The impulse response function is orthogonalized to allow for
contemporaneous effects. The ordering of the variables is such that HFTNMBSD has a contemporaneous
effect on non-HFTNMB and returns. non-HFTNMB has a contemporaneous effect on returns but does
not contemporaneously affect HFTNMBSD. Returns are assumed to have no contemporaneous effect on
either trading measure. Impulse response functions are estimated by stock each day, and then the daily
cross-sectional mean is calculated. The solid line is the mean of the daily time series, and the dotted lines
indicate 95% confidence intervals using standard errors calculated from the daily time-series of mean impulse
response functions. The impulse response functions are calculated separately for the first 30 minutes of the
trading day, from 30 minutes after the open to 30 minutes before the close, and for the last 30 minutes. For
a stock to be included on a given day, there must be at least 25 non-zero observations per variable in each
of the three time periods.
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Appendix B
Heteroskedasticity in VAR estimates
Since the vector autoregressions are estimated at the stock level, differences in the
precision of coefficient estimates among stocks may warrent different weightings for stocks
when creating summary statistics. The precision of the coefficient estimates are going to be
related to the number of non-zero observations for the stock during the day. While there are
many seconds in the trading day, during most seconds, returns and imbalances are zero. If
a stock has more seconds when returns and imbalances are non-zero, then the coefficients in
the VAR will be estimated more precisely.
To get a sense for how the precision of these VAR estimates varies with the number of
non-zero observations, Figure B.1 plots the distribution of individual stock-day coefficients
on the first lag of HFT net marketable buying from the equation in which non-HFT net
marketable buying is the dependent variable. The figure clearly shows that when the number
of non-zero observations for a stock on a given day is small, the coefficient estimates are more
variable. Consequently, giving more weight to stock days with more non-zero observations
may improve estimates of the estimate for the full population.
Table B.1 compares how different weighting schemes affect estimates of the popu-
lation average. The table reports time-series means and standard errors of daily weighted
cross-sectional mean coefficient estimates. There are four different weighting schemes that
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are functions of the minimum number of non-zero observations among the independent vari-
ables for the stock that day, ηj. The first weights observations equally, which assumes all
coefficients are estimated with equal precision. Figure B.1 suggests coefficients estimated
with a larger ηj are more precise, and the three other weighting schemes account for this by
giving more weight to stocks for which ηj is larger. The second weighting scheme assigns a
weight of zero to stocks for which ηj ≤ 100 and 1 to those for which ηj > 100. This weighting
scheme just excludes the least precise estimates. The third schemes weights stocks by ηj, and
the fourth weights stocks by
√
ηj. The fourth assumes precision is increasing in ηj, but at
a decreasing rate, perhaps because of autocorrelation among nearby stock-day observations.
The scheme that weights coefficient estimates by ηj has the lowest White and Newey-West
standard error estimates, so that weighting scheme appears to be the most efficient.
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Figure B.1: Heteroskedasticity in stock-day VAR coefficients
The figure shows how the precision of coefficient estimates in the VAR varies by the number of non-zero
observations for the stock the day the VAR is estimated. The figure plots coefficients on the first lag of HFT
net marketable buying from a regression where the dependent variable is non-HFT net marketable buying
and the independent variables are 10 lags of HFT net marketable buying, non-HFT net marketable buying,
and returns. The x-axis is the minimum number of non-zero observations among the HFT, non-HFT, and
return time series for the stock that day.
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Table B.1: Different weighting schemes for VAR coefficients
This table compares different schemes for weighting stock-day VAR coefficient estimates. The schemes are
evaluated using estimates of the coefficient on the first lag of HFT net marketable buying in the following
OLS regression estimated separately for each stock each day,









λjRj,t−i + εj,t,non-HFT (B.1)
Where j indexes stocks and t indexes seconds. Estimates are averaged each day, and the table reports
means and standard errors for the time series of daily cross-sectional means. The weightings refer to how
the cross-sectional mean each day is calculated. The weights are functions of ηj , the minimum number
of non-zero observations among the independent variables in the regression for stock j that day. Three
standard error estimates are reported: standard OLS estimates, estimates following White (1980), and
estimates following Newey and West (1994).
Weight wj = µ SEOLS SEWhite SENeweyWest
1 0.00667 0.003634 0.003642 0.003603
If ηj ≤ 100⇒ 0 else 1 0.00195 0.000220 0.000220 0.000312
ηj 0.00205 0.000213 0.000213 0.000307√
ηj 0.00253 0.000306 0.000306 0.000345
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